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90CNServer/client-patch/raid_probe.cpp
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hanfuit 645b64fe21 DNF90 服务端与启动器完整源码（含 GM 工具功能增强） 
服务端（Go）：
- GM 塞背包/带属性装备发放：在线角色推送 op14 增量物品行，背包实时刷新，无需回角色选择界面
- GM 改金币/改等级：去掉在线拒绝，落库后推送 op14 钱包/op37 等级状态，在线实时刷新
- 等级端点统一切换到新版 GMSetCharacterLevel（自带在线刷新）
- 无限/锁死疲劳模式 + 燃烧疲劳：每房间消耗 2 点、打怪与通关经验双倍
- 燃烧疲劳开关时给所有在线角色推送系统提示（op12 mode 0）
- 深渊史诗掉率：GM 全局倍率 + 城镇增益药剂窗口倍率，真实接入掉落结算

启动器（Python/JS）：
- 标题栏自绘、窗口 1204x717、禁止拖拽改大小、仅最小化/关闭
- GM 工具：疲劳与燃烧、深渊史诗掉率、拍卖行上架（单一定价对齐）
- 拍卖行上架前端对齐服务端单一价格语义，修复 400 报错
2026-11-04 14:31:55 +08:00

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// ============================================================================
// MERGED INTO 90CN.dll -- 2026-09-17
//
// This file used to be the whole of RaidProbe.dll: a module the operator
// injected into DNF.exe after 90CN.dll. It is now one translation unit of the
// 90CN project (client-patch\raid_probe.cpp, listed in 90CN.vcxproj) and its
// entry point is InstallRaidProbe(), which 90CN's install worker calls once its
// own hooks are installed.
//
// WHY THE ORDER MATTERS: the SceneUiOpen observer below is a TAIL-JUMP that
// chains onto an E9 hook somebody else already wrote at the target. Injection
// used to guarantee that "somebody else" was 90CN.dll, because 90CN loaded
// first. Merged into one module the guarantee has to be explicit, so
// InstallRaidProbe() is called at the END of 90CN's install sequence -- and the
// observer still refuses to install if the E9 is not there, exactly as before.
//
// WHAT DID NOT CHANGE: the hook plan (kPlan), the fail-closed byte-signature
// checks, RaidProbe.log written next to the client, and the dry-run self-test
// that runs in any host that is not DNF.exe.
//
// WHAT ELSE CHANGED (same day): the module reads no INI file and no environment
// variable any more. Its RaidProbe.ini switches became the compile-time
// constants in raidProbeConfig below, and the create-window owner restore --
// never enabled in RaidProbe.ini -- is gone with its switch.
//
// WHAT IS GONE: RaidProbe.vcxproj, build_raidprobe.bat and the separately
// injected RaidProbe.dll. Nothing else consumed them.
// ============================================================================
//
// ============================================================================
// RaidProbe.dll -- standalone diagnostic probe for the Anton raid
// "闂傚倸鍊风粈渚€骞栭锕€绠悗锝庡枛闂傤垶鏌ㄥ┑鍡╂Ц闁绘帒鐏氶妵鍕箳瀹ュ牆鍘″銈忕稻閻擄繝骞婂璺虹厸闁告劧绲芥禍?/ 闂傚倸鍊风粈渚€骞夐敓鐘偓鍐幢濡炴洘妞介獮瀣熆椤戭剙瀚欢鐐测攽閻愵亜鐏柛鐘崇墵瀹曞綊骞嗚閺嗭箓鏌涢妷銏℃珦闁衡偓? selection window.
//
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// REVISION 2 -- why v1 hard-crashed the game (2026-09-15 22:36:37)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// v1 wrote its log with:
// _wfopen_s(&fp, path, L"a, ccs=UTF-8"); // wide-oriented stream
// fprintf(fp, "..."); // NARROW write -> invalid
//
// `ccs=UTF-8` opens a *wide* stream; the matching writer is fwprintf (the
// working XLog.h in this project uses exactly that). Calling the narrow
// fprintf on it tripped the CRT's invalid-parameter path:
//
// _invalid_parameter_noinfo_noreturn -> __fastfail(FAST_FAIL_INVALID_ARG)
// RVA 0x8417: push 5 / pop ecx / int 0x29
//
// which Windows recorded as:
// Faulting module : RaidProbe.dll
// Exception code : 0xc0000409 (STATUS_STACK_BUFFER_OVERRUN)
// Fault offset : 0x00008417
//
// _wfopen_s had already created the file, so RaidProbe.log existed at 0 bytes
// and not a single hook was ever installed.
//
// v2 therefore uses NO CRT for I/O or formatting:
// * CreateFileW / WriteFile (kernel32)
// * wsprintfA / wvsprintfA (user32)
// and, as a belt-and-braces net, installs a no-op invalid-parameter handler so
// that no CRT misuse can ever fastfail the host again.
//
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// WHAT IT ANSWERS
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Clicking "闂傚倸鍊风粈渚€骞栭锕€绠悗锝庡枛闂傤垶鏌ㄥ┑鍡╂Ц闁绘帒鐏氶妵鍕箳瀹ュ牆鍘″銈忕稻閻擄繝骞婂璺虹厸闁告劧绲芥禍? in ui/raidwindow/raidselectsinglemodewindow.xui does
// nothing and the client sends no packet. The native handler is
//
// void __cdecl sub_1EF2C70(uint32_t controlId) VA 0x01EF2C70
// controlId 0x1388 (5000) = 闂傚倸鍊风粈渚€骞栭锕€绠悗锝庡枛闂傤垶鏌ㄥ┑鍡╂Ц闁绘帒鐏氶妵鍕箳瀹ュ牆鍘″銈忕稻閻擄繝骞婂璺虹厸闁告劧绲芥禍? (team, 20 members)
// any other id = 闂傚倸鍊风粈渚€骞夐敓鐘偓鍐幢濡炴洘妞介獮瀣熆椤戭剙瀚欢鐐测攽閻愵亜鐏柛鐘崇墵瀹曞綊骞嗚閺嗭箓鏌涢妷銏℃珦闁衡偓?//
// and the 0x1388 path is:
//
// 0x1EF2E60 cmp dword [ebp+8], 0x1388
// 0x1EF2E67 jne 0x1EF2FB8 ; -> 闂傚倸鍊风粈渚€骞夐敓鐘偓鍐幢濡炴洘妞介獮瀣熆椤戭剙瀚欢鐐测攽閻愵亜鐏柛鐘崇墵瀹曞綊骞嗚閺嗭箓鏌涢妷銏℃珦闁衡偓?branch
// 0x1EF2E6D call 0x1CF2A70 ; GetScene()
// 0x1EF2E74 je 0x1EF2FDC ; * silent bail
// 0x1EF2E81 call 0x1CF26E0 ; GetSub(scene)
// 0x1EF2E88 je 0x1EF2FDC ; * silent bail
// 0x1EF2E8F mov byte [0x5195BB8], 1 ; team-mode flag
// 0x1EF2E96 call 0x3417020 ; the real action
//
// 0x1EF2FDC is a shared, silent cleanup exit, so "nothing happens" means one
// of those two checks failed, or the click never reached the handler at all.
//
// HOOKS (all read-only observers; every one calls the original through its
// trampoline, so no game behaviour is altered)
// 0x01EF2C70 mode-select handler entry/exit + the two checks evaluated
// 0x03417020 the action the 0x1388 path calls
// 0x017B22C0 GetMyRaid() -- non-null means the create window never opens
// 0x017B1DE0 create-attack-party entry; logs the UI owner byte it pushes
// 0x01B49240 the C2S 664 CREATE_RAID sender
// 0x02FDD1A0 SceneUiOpen -- observe-only tail-jump (90CN.dll owns it)
// 0x010384A0 raid mode-select window handler
// ---- v11, added below: four observers on the S2C raid packet path ----
// 0x01D71CA0 S2C op591 (0x24F) entry -> [591] key/mode
// 0x017BF120 member-array reader -> [17BF120] obj/count
// 0x00A42AB0 op1359 handler tail target -> [A42AB0] mgr
// 0x017BDF60 raid UI refresh notification -> [17BDF60] caller
//
// FAIL-CLOSED: every target is byte-signature verified before it is patched,
// and the trampoline is published before the patch is enabled.
//
// ============================================================================
// REVISION 3 (v11) -- the four S2C observers
// ============================================================================
// Added to the module above; nothing existing changed behaviour. All four are
// OBSERVE-ONLY: each detour is `pushad / log / popad / jmp <trampoline>`, so
// no register, argument or return value of the hooked function is altered, and
// the relocated prologue is replayed byte-for-byte before control returns to
// target+relocLen.
//
// WHY THESE FOUR (from this project's own raid RE, tools/raid_opcode_table.txt
// and DNF90_閫嗗悜淇绗旇.md): every S2C handler reads its body through ONE
// global cursor pair --
// 0x052F8500 cursor (pointer into the current packet body)
// 0x052F8504 remaining
// -- and every read advances it, so at a handler's entry the cursor is already
// positioned on the field that handler reads next. That is what makes these
// observers cheap and non-invasive: they read the cursor, not the handler.
//
// PATCH SHAPES (verified byte-for-byte against client-patch\bin\DNF.exe):
// 0x01D71CA0 / 0x017BF120 / 0x017BDF60
// 55 push ebp \ relocated into the trampoline
// 8B EC mov ebp, esp | lens = {1,2,2} (5 bytes)
// 6A FF push -1 /
// 68 xx xx xx xx push imm32 <- NOT patched, stays in place
// patchLen = 5: a 5-byte E9 replaces exactly those three instructions --
// it lands on the `push imm32` boundary. The trampoline relays the same
// 5 bytes and returns to target+5, where the ORIGINAL `push imm32` still
// is, so that instruction really executes. Relayed length == patched
// length, so InstallHook()'s invariant (sum(lens) == patchLen) and every
// other hook's install path are untouched.
// 0x00A42AB0
// C6 81 1E 0E 00 00 01 mov byte ptr [ecx+0xE1E], 1 (7 bytes)
// patchLen = 7, lens = {7}: patching 5 would cut this instruction in half.
//
// LOG VOLUME: 591 and 17BF120 sit on per-packet paths, so each hook has its
// own line budget (kHookLogCap) on top of Log()'s global 20 000-line cap, and
// drops to silence once it is spent.
//
// SELF-TEST (never runs inside the game): in any host that is not DNF.exe the
// live install correctly fails closed on every signature, which says nothing
// about the plan itself. So the module then DRY-RUNS the whole plan against the
// real bytes of DNF.exe read from disk (PE VA -> file offset), installing each
// hook into a private copy of its target page, and finally EXECUTES the four
// v11 observers once each through their own installed hook with a synthetic
// packet cursor mapped at the address they read. That proves the VA, the lens
// table, the patch length, the relayed prologue, the stack discipline and the
// log line -- without launching the game and without touching game memory.
// ============================================================================
// REVISION 4 (v12) -- one fail-closed byte patch, and NOT a hook
// ============================================================================
// Everything from v11 is unchanged. Added: the "claim patch" at
// 0x01D7222C -- a single 5-byte rewrite that removes one call in the mode-3
// branch of the 0x24F (raid object / roster) handler:
//
// 0x01D72219 mov eax, [ebp-0x14] ; raid_key
// 0x01D7221E shr ecx, 0x10 ; raid_key >> 16
// 0x01D72221 cmp ecx, ebx ; ebx = the client's own channel
// 0x01D72223 jne 0x01D7225C ; not our channel -> skip
// 0x01D7222B 50 ; push eax -- the argument, and it is
// ; OUTSIDE the 5 patched bytes
// 0x01D7222C call 0x017C3470 ; E8 3F 12 A5 FF -> 58 90 90 90 90
//
// sub_17C3470 writes [sceneOwner+4] = raid_key (and swaps the raid window:
// closes 0x76/0x74/0x77, opens 0x75). Without the call a foreign raid's roster
// still arrives and still renders, but the client no longer adopts that raid
// as its own. That setter has THREE call sites and only this one is patched:
// 0x01D0438B (sub_1D04340, the 664 response handler) is the legitimate
// "I am a member" path, and 0x01D71EF4 (mode 0 of this same handler, i.e. the
// server's broadcastRuntimeRaidCreate, which only members receive) may be
// load-bearing for members. Both are deliberately left alone.
//
// WHY `pop eax` AND NOT FIVE NOPs -- the one thing here that must never be
// "simplified": the argument push at 0x01D7222B is one byte BEFORE the patch,
// so it stays, and sub_17C3470 is callee-cleanup (its only exit is
// `mov esp,ebp; pop ebp; ret 4` at 0x017C3703, and all three call sites push
// one argument and never `add esp,4`), i.e. the CALLEE is what pops that
// argument. Remove the call and nobody pops it: esp then stays 4 bytes low from
// 0x01D72231 all the way to the epilogue at 0x01D722A2, whose restores are
// esp-relative (`pop ecx / pop edi / pop esi / pop ebx`), so the handler's
// caller would get edi/esi/ebx back one slot out. `pop eax` is the one-byte
// instruction that consumes exactly that argument -- and eax already held the
// pushed value, so no register and no flag changes. Five NOPs are NOT
// equivalent, and the self-test's "claim-patch verify" line fails if the first
// byte is not 0x58.
//
// It is NOT in kPlan[]: kPlan[] describes detours, and this is a plain,
// complete rewrite of one instruction (`E8 rel32` = exactly the 5 patched
// bytes), so there is no trampoline, no relocated prologue and no slot for
// another thread to race with. It is a behaviour change, not an observation,
// so it is gated by raidProbeConfig::kApplyClaimPatch (a compile-time constant
// now that the module reads no INI) and is FAIL-CLOSED:
// the 5 bytes are read and compared with the expected original first, and on
// any mismatch the patch is refused and the client is left untouched.
//
// The self-test host also dry-runs it against DNF.exe on disk, next to the
// plan dry-run, and prints
// claim-patch dry-run: bytes at 01D7222C = E8 3F 12 A5 FF (MATCH)
// claim-patch verify: 01D7222C = 58 (pop eax), 5 bytes, next insn at
// 01D72231 OK
// or a FAIL that names the bytes actually found.
// ============================================================================
#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
#include <windows.h>
#include <intrin.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#pragma comment(lib, "user32.lib")
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Safety net: never let this module trip the CRT invalid-parameter fastfail.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void __cdecl NoOpInvalidParameter(const wchar_t*, const wchar_t*,
const wchar_t*, unsigned, uintptr_t)
{
// deliberately empty: the _s functions will return their error code
}
static const uintptr_t kImageBase = 0x00400000; // DNF.exe preferred base
// Resolved once at startup from GetModuleHandleW(NULL). Declared up here so
// every helper below, including the string dumper, can use it.
static uintptr_t g_base = kImageBase;
// This module's own HMODULE, resolved by InstallRaidProbe() from an address
// inside it -- the dry-run self-test needs the module directory to find DNF.exe
// on disk.
static HMODULE g_selfModule = NULL;
static wchar_t g_selfDir[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
// Captures the module directory (with its trailing backslash) into g_selfDir.
static void ResolveSelfDirectory(HMODULE selfModule)
{
if (!selfModule) return;
wchar_t path[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
DWORD n = GetModuleFileNameW(selfModule, path, MAX_PATH);
if (n == 0 || n >= MAX_PATH) return;
wchar_t* slash = path;
for (wchar_t* p = path; *p; ++p) if (*p == L'\\') slash = p;
if (*slash != L'\\') return;
*(slash + 1) = 0;
size_t i = 0;
for (; path[i] && i < MAX_PATH - 1; i++) g_selfDir[i] = path[i];
g_selfDir[i] = 0;
}
// Absolute VA -> runtime address, for the kPlan[] entries and the absolute
// constants below (image base 0x400000). The kRva* constants further down are
// image-relative and are used as `g_base + kRva` directly; mixing the two
// conventions silently produces an address that is always wrong, which is the
// mistake documented at kVaCreateButtonGetMyRaidCaller.
static inline uintptr_t Va(uintptr_t va) { return g_base + (va - kImageBase); }
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Logging -- raw Win32, no CRT
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static CRITICAL_SECTION g_logLock;
static HANDLE g_log = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
static volatile LONG g_started = 0;
static DWORD g_t0 = 0;
static DWORD NowMs() { return GetTickCount() - g_t0; }
static void Log(const char* fmt, ...)
{
if (g_log == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return;
// Hard cap so a runaway hot path can never fill the disk.
static volatile LONG s_lines = 0;
if (InterlockedIncrement(&s_lines) > 20000) return;
char msg[768];
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
int n = wvsprintfA(msg, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (n < 0) n = 0;
if (n > (int)sizeof(msg) - 1) n = (int)sizeof(msg) - 1;
char line[832];
int head = wsprintfA(line, "[%8u] ", (unsigned)NowMs());
if (head < 0) head = 0;
if (head > (int)sizeof(line) - 4) head = (int)sizeof(line) - 4;
for (int i = 0; i < n && head + i < (int)sizeof(line) - 3; i++)
line[head + i] = msg[i];
int len = head + n;
if (len > (int)sizeof(line) - 3) len = (int)sizeof(line) - 3;
line[len++] = '\r';
line[len++] = '\n';
EnterCriticalSection(&g_logLock);
DWORD written = 0;
WriteFile(g_log, line, (DWORD)len, &written, NULL);
LeaveCriticalSection(&g_logLock);
}
static bool OpenLog()
{
wchar_t path[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
if (GetModuleFileNameW(NULL, path, MAX_PATH) == 0) return false;
wchar_t* slash = path;
for (wchar_t* p = path; *p; ++p) if (*p == L'\\') slash = p;
if (*slash == L'\\') *(slash + 1) = 0; else path[0] = 0;
static const wchar_t kSuffix[] = L"RaidProbe.log";
// Prefer the host executable's directory; fall back to %TEMP% so a
// read-only or protected game directory still yields a usable log.
const wchar_t* candidates[2] = { path, NULL };
wchar_t temp[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
if (GetTempPathW(MAX_PATH, temp) != 0) candidates[1] = temp;
for (int c = 0; c < 2; c++) {
if (!candidates[c]) continue;
wchar_t full[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
size_t used = 0;
while (candidates[c][used]) { full[used] = candidates[c][used]; used++; }
bool ok = true;
for (size_t i = 0; i < (sizeof(kSuffix) / sizeof(wchar_t)); i++) {
if (used + i >= MAX_PATH) { ok = false; break; }
full[used + i] = kSuffix[i];
}
if (!ok) continue;
g_log = CreateFileW(full, FILE_APPEND_DATA,
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL,
OPEN_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
if (g_log != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return true;
}
return false;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// COMPILE-TIME CONFIGURATION -- this module reads no INI file and no
// environment variable.
//
// Every knob below used to be an external switch read from
// <host exe dir>\RaidProbe.ini. They are constants now: change a value and
// rebuild. The values are the ones this probe ran with while the Anton raid work
// was live (RaidProbe.ini carried patch_claim=1 and force_putong=1); the
// create-window owner restore, which was never enabled there, is gone with its
// switch.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
namespace raidProbeConfig {
// The 5-byte rewrite at 0x01D7222C that stops the client from adopting a raid it
// merely browsed. FAIL-CLOSED: the original bytes are compared first.
constexpr bool kApplyClaimPatch = true;
// Rescue the dead BUTTON_TWENTY branch of the mode-select window by opening the
// create window ourselves when a click produced nothing at all.
constexpr bool kRescueTwentyPlayerButton = true;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Trampoline relocation.
//
// THE BUG THIS EXISTS TO PREVENT (hit in the live game, 2026-09-15 22:44):
// sub_17B1DE0's first instruction is `E8 8B 0C 54 00` -- a *rel32* call. v3
// copied those five bytes verbatim into a trampoline allocated at 0x1C300000,
// but rel32 is relative to the instruction's own address, so the copy became
// `call 0x1C300005 + 0x540C8B` = 0x21740C90, far outside DNF.exe's image
// (which ends near 0x63B1590). Executing it faulted and the game's own crash
// handler (CrashDNF2.cra) took the process down on the first click of
// 缂傚倸鍊搁崐鎼佸磹妞嬪海鐭嗗ù锝堛€€閸嬫挸顫濋悡搴＄睄閻庤娲滈幊鎾伙綖濠靛牊宕夐柧蹇曟嚀閹藉姊洪懡銈呅㈡繛灞傚€曢锝囨崉閹巻鍋撻幒妤€绠涢柣妤€鐗冮幏? with no WER event.
//
// A naive byte copy is only safe when the copied instructions contain no
// relative operand. Four of the five targets are `push ebp / mov ebp,esp / ...`
// and were fine; createEntry was not.
//
// So the copy now walks an explicit per-instruction length table (the bytes
// were verified against the image, so the boundaries are known) and recomputes
// any relative branch so it keeps pointing at the same absolute destination.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static bool RelocateCopy(const BYTE* src, BYTE* dst, uintptr_t srcVa,
uintptr_t dstVa, const BYTE* lens, size_t count)
{
size_t off = 0;
for (size_t k = 0; k < count; k++) {
size_t n = lens[k];
if (n == 0 || n > 8) return false; // unknown shape -> refuse
for (size_t j = 0; j < n; j++) dst[off + j] = src[off + j];
const BYTE* s = src + off;
BYTE* d = dst + off;
uintptr_t sVa = srcVa + off;
uintptr_t dVa = dstVa + off;
if ((s[0] == 0xE8 || s[0] == 0xE9) && n == 5) {
int32_t rel = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) ((BYTE*)&rel)[j] = s[1 + j];
uintptr_t absTarget = sVa + 5 + (intptr_t)rel;
int32_t nrel = (int32_t)(absTarget - (dVa + 5));
for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) d[1 + j] = ((BYTE*)&nrel)[j];
} else if (s[0] == 0x0F && (s[1] & 0xF0) == 0x80 && n == 6) {
int32_t rel = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) ((BYTE*)&rel)[j] = s[2 + j];
uintptr_t absTarget = sVa + 6 + (intptr_t)rel;
int32_t nrel = (int32_t)(absTarget - (dVa + 6));
for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) d[2 + j] = ((BYTE*)&nrel)[j];
} else if ((s[0] == 0xEB || (s[0] >= 0x70 && s[0] <= 0x7F)) && n == 2) {
int8_t rel = (int8_t)s[1];
uintptr_t absTarget = sVa + 2 + (intptr_t)rel;
intptr_t delta = (intptr_t)absTarget - (intptr_t)(dVa + 2);
if (delta < -128 || delta > 127) return false; // cannot stay short
d[1] = (BYTE)(int8_t)delta;
}
off += n;
}
return true;
}
// Length tables for the copied prologues (verified against the image).
static const BYTE kLens_A[] = { 1, 2, 2 }; // 55 | 8B EC | 6A FF
static const BYTE kLens_B[] = { 1, 2, 1, 3 }; // 55 | 8B EC | 53 | 8B 5D 08
static const BYTE kLens_C[] = { 1, 2, 4 }; // 56 | 8B F1 | 83 7E 08 00
static const BYTE kLens_D[] = { 5 }; // E8 rel32 <-- the rel32 case
// Arithmetic check of the relocator, run at every startup so a regression is
// visible in the log instead of in a game crash. No code is executed: the
// relocated displacement must resolve to the same absolute target as the
// original.
static bool SelfTestRelocator()
{
BYTE src[5] = { 0xE8, 0x8B, 0x0C, 0x54, 0x00 }; // real createEntry bytes
const uintptr_t srcVa = 0x017B1DE0;
const uintptr_t dstVa = 0x1C300000;
BYTE dst[5] = { 0 };
if (!RelocateCopy(src, dst, srcVa, dstVa, kLens_D, 1)) return false;
int32_t rel = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) ((BYTE*)&rel)[j] = dst[1 + j];
uintptr_t got = dstVa + 5 + (intptr_t)rel;
int32_t orel = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) ((BYTE*)&orel)[j] = src[1 + j];
uintptr_t want = srcVa + 5 + (intptr_t)orel;
// The relocated call must still land on 0x01CF2A70 and stay in the image.
return got == want && want == 0x01CF2A70;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Inline hook with an explicit, pre-verified patch length.
// The trampoline is published through `slot` BEFORE the patch is enabled, so a
// thread that enters the target during installation still reaches the original.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static bool InstallHook(uintptr_t target, void* detour, size_t patchLen,
const BYTE* lens, size_t lensCount, void** slot)
{
if (patchLen < 5 || patchLen > 16) return false;
// The length table must exactly cover the patched region. A mismatch means
// the table and the target disagree, which is exactly the class of mistake
// that produced the v3 game crash.
size_t sum = 0;
for (size_t k = 0; k < lensCount; k++) sum += lens[k];
if (sum != patchLen) return false;
BYTE* tramp = (BYTE*)VirtualAlloc(NULL, patchLen + 8,
MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
if (!tramp) return false;
__try {
if (!RelocateCopy((const BYTE*)target, tramp, target, (uintptr_t)tramp,
lens, lensCount)) {
VirtualFree(tramp, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
return false;
}
tramp[patchLen] = 0xE9;
*(int32_t*)(tramp + patchLen + 1) =
(int32_t)((target + patchLen) - ((uintptr_t)tramp + patchLen + 5));
*slot = tramp; // publish first
MemoryBarrier();
DWORD old = 0;
if (!VirtualProtect((void*)target, patchLen,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &old)) {
VirtualFree(tramp, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
*slot = NULL;
return false;
}
*(BYTE*)target = 0xE9;
*(int32_t*)(target + 1) = (int32_t)((uintptr_t)detour - (target + 5));
for (size_t i = 5; i < patchLen; i++) *(BYTE*)(target + i) = 0x90;
VirtualProtect((void*)target, patchLen, old, &old);
FlushInstructionCache(GetCurrentProcess(), (void*)target, patchLen);
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
*slot = NULL;
VirtualFree(tramp, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
return false;
}
return true;
}
// Chaining variant: 90CN.dll already detours SceneUiOpen (sub_2FDD1A0), so its
// first byte in the live process is E9 rel32 rather than the native prologue.
// Copying those five bytes into a trampoline would jump away and never return,
// and re-pointing the trampoline at `target` would recurse into our own hook.
//
// The original has THREE stack args and is CALLEE-CLEANUP (`ret 0xC`) -- proven
// by sub_17B1DE0, which calls it and then just `ret`s with no `add esp,0xC`.
// So a naive `E8 oldDest; C3` trampoline would leave esp 12 bytes too high: the
// callee already removed the arguments, and the C3 would then pop an argument
// as if it were a return address. The trampoline must re-push the arguments for
// the inner call and clean its own on the way out:
//
// FF 74 24 0C push dword [esp+0x0C] ; group
// FF 74 24 0C push dword [esp+0x0C] ; mode (each push shifts the frame)
// FF 74 24 0C push dword [esp+0x0C] ; owner
// E8 rel32 call oldDest
// C2 0C 00 ret 0xC
//
// Net effect: exactly one call through to the other module's hook, and the
// caller's three arguments are consumed exactly once.
static bool InstallHookEx(uintptr_t target, void* detour, size_t patchLen,
const BYTE* lens, size_t lensCount, void** slot)
{
BYTE first = 0;
__try { first = *(volatile BYTE*)target; }
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { return false; }
if (first != 0xE9) {
return InstallHook(target, detour, patchLen, lens, lensCount, slot);
}
uintptr_t oldDest = 0;
__try {
int32_t rel = *(int32_t*)(target + 1);
oldDest = target + 5 + (intptr_t)rel;
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { return false; }
BYTE* tramp = (BYTE*)VirtualAlloc(NULL, 32, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
if (!tramp) return false;
__try {
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
tramp[i * 4 + 0] = 0xFF;
tramp[i * 4 + 1] = 0x74;
tramp[i * 4 + 2] = 0x24;
tramp[i * 4 + 3] = 0x0C;
}
tramp[12] = 0xE8;
*(int32_t*)(tramp + 13) =
(int32_t)(oldDest - ((uintptr_t)tramp + 18));
tramp[17] = 0xC2;
tramp[18] = 0x0C;
tramp[19] = 0x00;
*slot = tramp; // publish first
MemoryBarrier();
DWORD old = 0;
if (!VirtualProtect((void*)target, 5, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &old)) {
*slot = NULL;
VirtualFree(tramp, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
return false;
}
*(BYTE*)target = 0xE9;
*(int32_t*)(target + 1) = (int32_t)((uintptr_t)detour - (target + 5));
VirtualProtect((void*)target, 5, old, &old);
FlushInstructionCache(GetCurrentProcess(), (void*)target, 5);
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
*slot = NULL;
VirtualFree(tramp, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
return false;
}
Log(" chained onto existing E9 hook at %08X -> oldDest=%08X",
(unsigned)target, (unsigned)oldDest);
return true;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Execution test for the chained trampoline above.
//
// The trampoline is hand-written machine code, so an arithmetic argument is not
// enough -- it must actually run. A __stdcall stand-in has exactly the same
// shape as the real callee (3 stack args, callee cleans), and calling the
// trampoline through a __fastcall function pointer that matches SceneUiOpen's
// signature exercises the real stack discipline, including the `ret 0xC`.
//
// Run ONLY when the host is not DNF.exe. If this logic were ever wrong it would
// corrupt the stack, and that must never be allowed to happen in the game.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static volatile int g_fakeSeen = -1;
static int __stdcall FakeOldDest(int owner, int mode, int group)
{
g_fakeSeen = owner * 1000000 + mode * 1000 + group;
return 0x1234;
}
static bool SelfTestChainedTrampoline()
{
BYTE* tramp = (BYTE*)VirtualAlloc(NULL, 32, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
if (!tramp) return false;
uintptr_t oldDest = (uintptr_t)&FakeOldDest;
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
tramp[i * 4 + 0] = 0xFF;
tramp[i * 4 + 1] = 0x74;
tramp[i * 4 + 2] = 0x24;
tramp[i * 4 + 3] = 0x0C;
}
tramp[12] = 0xE8;
*(int32_t*)(tramp + 13) = (int32_t)(oldDest - ((uintptr_t)tramp + 18));
tramp[17] = 0xC2;
tramp[18] = 0x0C;
tramp[19] = 0x00;
FlushInstructionCache(GetCurrentProcess(), tramp, 20);
typedef int (__fastcall* Fn)(void*, void*, int, int, int);
Fn fn = (Fn)tramp;
g_fakeSeen = -1;
int r = fn(NULL, NULL, 0x76, 0x11, 0x22); // owner, mode, group
VirtualFree(tramp, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
return (r == 0x1234) &&
(g_fakeSeen == 0x76 * 1000000 + 0x11 * 1000 + 0x22);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Decode the client's obfuscated string constants.
//
// sub_34D9B20(enc) returns a UTF-16 string; the raid mode-select handler at
// 0x010384A0 (proven by the v6 log: sceneUiOpen ... caller=01038542) compares
// the window's current mode against three of these and then either opens
// RaidCreateWindow (owner 0x76, group=1 or group=0) or does NOTHING AT ALL.
// Naming those three strings is exactly what tells us whether 闂備礁鎼幏瀣闯閿濆鐒垫い鎺嶈兌椤ｆ煡鎳氶埡鍐ｅ亾?is the
// branch that silently does nothing.
//
// The encoding is proprietary (key derived from cipher[1]&0xFE and cipher[2..3]
// by sub_34D99F0), so rather than reimplement it we simply call the game's own
// decoder. It self-initializes and is a pure function.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static const uintptr_t kRvaStrDecode = 0x030D9B20; // sub_34D9B20
static const uintptr_t kRaidStrings[] = {
0x04327780, // sub_010384A0 branch #1 -> SceneUiOpen(0x76, group=1)
0x0432775C, // sub_010384A0 branch #2 -> SceneUiOpen(0x76, group=0)
0x04327744, // sub_010384A0 branch #3 -> NO window at all
0x044D1578, // used by sub_1B49240 (the 664 builder)
0x044D1550, // used by sub_1B49240
0x044D1568, // used by sub_1B49240
0x044D1340, // used by sub_1B49240
};
static void DumpRaidStrings()
{
typedef const wchar_t* (__cdecl* DecodeFn)(void* enc);
DecodeFn fn = (DecodeFn)(g_base + kRvaStrDecode);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < sizeof(kRaidStrings) / sizeof(kRaidStrings[0]); i++) {
uintptr_t va = g_base + (kRaidStrings[i] - kImageBase);
__try {
const wchar_t* s = fn((void*)va);
if (!s) {
Log("str 0x%08X = <null>", (unsigned)va);
continue;
}
char utf8[320] = { 0 };
int n = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, s, -1, utf8,
(int)sizeof(utf8) - 1, NULL, NULL);
if (n <= 0) utf8[0] = 0;
Log("str 0x%08X = \"%s\"", (unsigned)va, utf8);
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
Log("str 0x%08X = <decode fault>", (unsigned)va);
}
}
}
static bool SignatureMatches(uintptr_t va, const BYTE* sig, size_t n)
{
// Guarded: if this module is ever loaded into a host that is not DNF.exe,
// the target addresses are unmapped and the check must fail, not fault.
__try {
return memcmp((const void*)va, sig, n) == 0;
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
return false;
}
}
// Guarded reads of arbitrary addresses. The packet cursor, the packet body it
// points at and the game objects the v11 observers inspect are all game memory:
// any of them can be unmapped (or can be a stale pointer), so EVERY read goes
// through one of these and never dereferences bare.
static bool SafeReadBytes(uintptr_t va, BYTE* out, size_t n)
{
__try {
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) out[i] = ((volatile BYTE*)va)[i];
return true;
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) out[i] = 0;
return false;
}
}
static bool SafeReadU32(uintptr_t va, uint32_t* out)
{
__try { *out = *(volatile uint32_t*)va; return true; }
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { *out = 0; return false; }
}
static bool SafeReadU8(uintptr_t va, unsigned* out)
{
__try { *out = *(volatile BYTE*)va; return true; }
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { *out = 0; return false; }
}
// ASCII hex dump of a short byte run ("55 8B EC 6A FF"), for the install log:
// the bytes actually read at a target are part of the evidence, so they are
// written out next to every OK line instead of being implied by the signature.
static void HexBytes(const BYTE* b, size_t n, char* out /* >= n*3 */)
{
static const char kHex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
size_t o = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (i) out[o++] = ' ';
out[o++] = kHex[(b[i] >> 4) & 0x0F];
out[o++] = kHex[b[i] & 0x0F];
}
out[o] = 0;
}
// Preview bytes for the "signature mismatch" log line. This MUST be guarded:
// when the check above fails because the address is unmapped, dereferencing it
// here would fault. (v2 hit exactly that -- RaidProbe.dll c0000005 at
// InstallThread+0x11E, `movzx eax, byte ptr [edi+4]`.)
static bool SafePreview(uintptr_t va, BYTE out[5])
{
return SafeReadBytes(va, out, 5);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Native game helpers we call directly (pure getters, no side effects)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// ALL addresses below are RVAs relative to the main module image base, and must
// be read as g_base + RVA. v2 mixed conventions here: kOwnerByteVa held an RVA
// (as 90CN.cpp does) but Detour_CreateEntry dereferenced it as if it were a VA,
// which logged a bogus "uiOwner=0x00".
// g_base itself is declared near the top of this file.
static const uintptr_t kRvaOwnerByte = 0x013B1E0D; // push imm8 in sub_17B1DE0
static const uintptr_t kRvaTeamFlag = 0x01195BB8; // mov byte [0x5195BB8],1
static const uintptr_t kRvaRaidService = 0x011B2748; // mov ecx, [0x51B2748]
static const uintptr_t kRvaGetScene = 0x018F2A70; // sub_1CF2A70
static const uintptr_t kRvaGetSub = 0x018F26E0; // sub_1CF26E0
static const uintptr_t kRvaSceneType = 0x01E63E80; // sub_2263E80
// Scene root pointer, as used by 90CN.cpp (kSceneRootPointerRva). This is the
// same [0x51B2764] the game itself loads before pushing a UI owner.
static const uintptr_t kRvaSceneRootPtr = 0x04DB2764;
// The client keeps one "is this UI owner open" vector per owner inside the
// scene root: begin/end at +4/+8 of a 20-byte slot at sceneRoot+0x108.
// (Same layout 90CN.cpp uses for its isOpen() checks.)
static const size_t kSceneUiVectorOffset = 0x108;
static const size_t kSceneUiVectorStride = 20;
static const unsigned kOwnerCreateWindow = 0x76; // RaidCreateWindow
static const unsigned kOwnerModeSelect = 0x7A; // RaidSelectSingleModeWindow
static const unsigned kOwnerAnnouncement = 0x298; // message / announcement
typedef void* (__cdecl* GetSceneFn)(void);
typedef void* (__fastcall* GetSubFn)(void* scene);
typedef int (__fastcall* SceneTypeFn)(void* scene);
static volatile LONG g_inModeSelect = 0;
static void* SafeGetScene()
{
__try {
GetSceneFn fn = (GetSceneFn)(g_base + kRvaGetScene);
return fn();
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { return NULL; }
}
static void* SafeGetSub(void* scene)
{
__try {
GetSubFn fn = (GetSubFn)(g_base + kRvaGetSub);
return fn(scene);
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { return NULL; }
}
static int SafeSceneType(void* scene)
{
__try {
SceneTypeFn fn = (SceneTypeFn)(g_base + kRvaSceneType);
return fn(scene);
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { return -1; }
}
static unsigned SafeReadByte(uintptr_t rva, bool* ok)
{
__try {
unsigned v = *(volatile BYTE*)(g_base + rva);
if (ok) *ok = true;
return v;
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
if (ok) *ok = false;
return 0;
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// UI owner open-state probe.
//
// Rather than also detouring SceneUiOpen (sub_2FDD1A0) -- which 90CN.dll
// already hooks, and hooking on top of an existing E9 jmp cannot be chained
// safely with a copy-trampoline -- we read the same state 90CN itself reads.
// This answers "did the mode-select window actually open, and did clicking a
// button close it?" without touching any hot code path.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void* SafeSceneRoot()
{
__try {
return *(void**)(g_base + kRvaSceneRootPtr);
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { return NULL; }
}
// -1 = unreadable, 0 = closed, 1 = open
static int SceneUiOwnerOpen(void* sceneRoot, unsigned owner)
{
if (!sceneRoot) return -1;
__try {
uintptr_t vec = (uintptr_t)sceneRoot + kSceneUiVectorOffset +
(uintptr_t)owner * kSceneUiVectorStride;
uint32_t begin = *(volatile uint32_t*)(vec + 4);
uint32_t end = *(volatile uint32_t*)(vec + 8);
return begin != end ? 1 : 0;
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { return -1; }
}
static void LogWindowState(const char* tag)
{
void* root = SafeSceneRoot();
int w76 = SceneUiOwnerOpen(root, kOwnerCreateWindow);
int w7a = SceneUiOwnerOpen(root, kOwnerModeSelect);
int w298 = SceneUiOwnerOpen(root, kOwnerAnnouncement);
Log("%s window76=%s window7A=%s window298=%s sceneRoot=%08X",
tag,
w76 < 0 ? "?" : (w76 ? "OPEN" : "closed"),
w7a < 0 ? "?" : (w7a ? "OPEN" : "closed"),
w298 < 0 ? "?" : (w298 ? "OPEN" : "closed"),
(unsigned)(uintptr_t)root);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 1. mode-select window handler void __cdecl sub_1EF2C70(uint32_t controlId)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
typedef void (__cdecl* ModeSelectFn)(uint32_t controlId);
static ModeSelectFn g_origModeSelect = NULL;
static void __cdecl Detour_ModeSelect(uint32_t controlId)
{
uintptr_t caller = (uintptr_t)_ReturnAddress();
const char* which = (controlId == 0x1388) ? "NORMAL/team(20p)"
: "other/single";
Log("modeSelect ENTER controlId=0x%X (%u) -> %s caller=+0x%X",
(unsigned)controlId, (unsigned)controlId, which,
(unsigned)(caller - kImageBase));
if (controlId == 0x1388) {
void* scene = SafeGetScene();
void* sub = scene ? SafeGetSub(scene) : NULL;
Log("modeSelect GetScene()=%08X GetSub(scene)=%08X -> %s",
(unsigned)(uintptr_t)scene, (unsigned)(uintptr_t)sub,
(scene && sub) ? "PASS, will call 0x3417020"
: "FAIL, silent bail at 0x1EF2FDC");
bool okTeam = false;
unsigned team = SafeReadByte(kRvaTeamFlag, &okTeam);
if (okTeam) Log("modeSelect teamFlag[+0x1195BB8]=%u", team);
else Log("modeSelect teamFlag[+0x1195BB8] unreadable");
}
InterlockedIncrement(&g_inModeSelect);
if (g_origModeSelect) g_origModeSelect(controlId);
InterlockedDecrement(&g_inModeSelect);
Log("modeSelect EXIT controlId=0x%X", (unsigned)controlId);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 2. the action the 0x1388 path calls void __cdecl sub_3417020(uint32_t)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
typedef void (__cdecl* ActionFn)(uint32_t arg);
static ActionFn g_origAction = NULL;
static void __cdecl Detour_Action(uint32_t arg)
{
LONG inside = InterlockedCompareExchange(&g_inModeSelect, 0, 0);
if (inside > 0) Log("action 0x3417020 ENTER arg=%u (from mode-select)", (unsigned)arg);
if (g_origAction) g_origAction(arg);
if (inside > 0) Log("action 0x3417020 EXIT arg=%u", (unsigned)arg);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 2b. SceneUiOpen sub_2FDD1A0 -- observe-only, TAIL-JUMP
//
// THE decisive hook. The v5 run proved that the mode-select window (owner 0x7A)
// opens and that clicking the single-player button leads to owner 0x76 opening
// and a 664 being built -- yet sub_1EF2C70 and sub_3417020 never ran once. So
// those are NOT the two button callbacks, and the only reliable way to find the
// real ones is to watch every window open with its owner, parameters and caller.
//
// 90CN's own hook is already on this function by the time this installs
// (InstallRaidProbe runs last in 90CN's install sequence). Rather than call through and return
// (which needs the exact stack convention and a relocated/call trampoline --
// v6's first attempt got that wrong and crashed its own self-test), this hook
// NEVER calls the original. It logs and then TAIL-JUMPS to whatever the
// pre-existing E9 already points at:
//
// pushad ; log ; popad ; jmp [g_sceneUiOldDest]
//
// pushad/popad balance, so the stack is byte-identical to what the original
// entry expects, and the other module's proxy performs its own `ret 0xC`
// straight back to the real caller. No trampoline, no return value, no
// convention assumptions. If the target is not already E9-hooked the install
// is refused -- there is no safe fallback that would not need a trampoline.
//
// At entry: [esp]=ret, [esp+4]=uiOwner, [esp+8]=mode, [esp+12]=group.
// After pushad the same slots are at +36/+40/+44 and the return address +32.
// For the announcement window (0x298) `mode` is a text pointer, so it is only
// ever printed as hex.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void* g_sceneUiOldDest = NULL;
extern "C" void LogSceneUiOpen(unsigned owner, unsigned mode, unsigned group,
unsigned caller)
{
Log("sceneUiOpen owner=0x%X (%u) mode=0x%X group=0x%X caller=%08X",
owner, owner, mode, group, caller);
}
extern "C" __declspec(naked) void Detour_SceneUiOpen()
{
__asm {
pushad
mov eax, [esp + 36] // uiOwner
mov ecx, [esp + 40] // mode
mov edx, [esp + 44] // group
mov ebx, [esp + 32] // return address = our caller
push ebx
push edx
push ecx
push eax
call LogSceneUiOpen
add esp, 16
popad
jmp dword ptr [g_sceneUiOldDest]
}
}
// Installs a tail-jump observer on a target that another module already hooked
// with an E9. Returns false (and patches nothing) otherwise.
static bool InstallTailJumpHook(uintptr_t target, void* detour)
{
BYTE first = 0;
__try { first = *(volatile BYTE*)target; }
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { return false; }
if (first != 0xE9) return false;
uintptr_t oldDest = 0;
__try {
int32_t rel = *(int32_t*)(target + 1);
oldDest = target + 5 + (intptr_t)rel;
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { return false; }
g_sceneUiOldDest = (void*)oldDest; // publish before patching
MemoryBarrier();
DWORD old = 0;
if (!VirtualProtect((void*)target, 5, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &old))
return false;
*(BYTE*)target = 0xE9;
*(int32_t*)(target + 1) = (int32_t)((uintptr_t)detour - (target + 5));
VirtualProtect((void*)target, 5, old, &old);
FlushInstructionCache(GetCurrentProcess(), (void*)target, 5);
return true;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 2c. Raid mode-select window handler sub_010384A0
//
// This is the handler the v6 log pinned down (sceneUiOpen ... caller=01038542).
// It branches on the NAME of the clicked control:
//
// 0x010384F1 push "BUTTON_ONE" -> match -> SceneUiOpen(0x76, 0, 1) = 闁告娲戝Ч澶娢熼垾宕囩
// 0x01038553 push "BUTTON_TWENTY" -> match -> SceneUiOpen(0x76, 0, 0) = 闁哄拋鍣ｉ埀顒佺鑶╃€?/ 20濞?// 0x010385A6 push "Cancel" -> match -> opens nothing
// no match -> returns, DOES NOTHING AT ALL
//
// In the live client BUTTON_ONE works and BUTTON_TWENTY produces no window, so
// the 20-player button silently dies. Its branch, though, issues exactly the
// same SceneUiOpen(0x76, mode=0, group=0) that the unpatched sub_17B1DE0 issues
// -- the call we know works.
//
// Rather than guess which part of the name compare fails, this hook watches the
// OUTCOME and repairs it: if a click on the mode-select window changed nothing
// at all, the create window is opened directly. That is self-calibrating --
// BUTTON_ONE already opens 0x76 so it is left alone, and Cancel closes 0x7A so
// it is left alone too. Only the dead button is rescued.
//
// Calling convention: the shared exit is `ret 0x10`, so this is ecx = self plus
// FOUR stack arguments (only the first two are read natively).
// Gated by raidProbeConfig::kRescueTwentyPlayerButton (compile-time constant).
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
typedef void (__fastcall* RaidModeHandlerFn)(void* self, void* unused,
unsigned a1, unsigned a2,
unsigned a3, unsigned a4);
static RaidModeHandlerFn g_origRaidModeHandler = NULL;
// SceneUiOpen's real shape is ecx = scene root + THREE stack args (ret 0xC),
// which matches 90CN.cpp's proven 5-parameter __fastcall declaration.
typedef void* (__fastcall* SceneUiOpenCall)(void* self, void* unused,
unsigned owner, int mode,
unsigned group);
static void ForceCreateRaidWindow()
{
__try {
void* self = *(void**)(g_base + kRvaSceneRootPtr);
SceneUiOpenCall fn =
(SceneUiOpenCall)(g_base + (0x02FDD1A0 - kImageBase));
fn(self, NULL, kOwnerCreateWindow, 0, 0);
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
Log("forceCreateWindow faulted");
}
}
// Closes the mode-select window itself.
//
// Both native branches that complete the mode choice call the same virtual:
// 0x01038542 mov edx, [ebx] ; ebx = ecx - 0x17c
// 0x01038544 mov eax, [edx + 0x78] ; vtable slot +0x78 = "close me"
// 0x01038549 call eax
// (the Cancel branch at 0x010385E3 does exactly the same.)
// The first fallback opened the create window without this, which is why the
// mode-select window was left sitting on screen behind it.
static void CloseModeSelectWindow(void* self)
{
__try {
void* target = (BYTE*)self - 0x17c; // `lea ebx,[ecx-0x17c]`
void** vtbl = *(void***)target;
if (!vtbl) {
Log("closeModeSelect: null vtable");
return;
}
typedef void (__fastcall* CloseFn)(void*);
CloseFn fn = (CloseFn)(*(void**)((BYTE*)vtbl + 0x78));
if (!fn) {
Log("closeModeSelect: null slot +0x78");
return;
}
Log("closeModeSelect: calling vtable+0x78 fn=%08X target=%08X",
(unsigned)(uintptr_t)fn, (unsigned)(uintptr_t)target);
fn(target);
Log("closeModeSelect: returned");
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
Log("closeModeSelect faulted");
}
}
static void __fastcall Detour_RaidModeHandler(void* self, void* unused,
unsigned a1, unsigned a2,
unsigned a3, unsigned a4)
{
uintptr_t caller = (uintptr_t)_ReturnAddress();
Log("modeHandler ENTER a1=0x%X a2=0x%X a3=0x%X a4=0x%X caller=%08X",
a1, a2, a3, a4, (unsigned)caller);
int before7a = SceneUiOwnerOpen(SafeSceneRoot(), kOwnerModeSelect);
int before76 = SceneUiOwnerOpen(SafeSceneRoot(), kOwnerCreateWindow);
if (g_origRaidModeHandler)
g_origRaidModeHandler(self, unused, a1, a2, a3, a4);
int after7a = SceneUiOwnerOpen(SafeSceneRoot(), kOwnerModeSelect);
int after76 = SceneUiOwnerOpen(SafeSceneRoot(), kOwnerCreateWindow);
Log("modeHandler EXIT window7A %d->%d window76 %d->%d",
before7a, after7a, before76, after76);
// Rescue the dead button: the click did nothing while the mode-select
// window was open, and that window stayed open. Mirror the native working
// branch exactly -- open the create window, THEN close the mode select --
// otherwise the mode-select window is left behind on screen.
if (raidProbeConfig::kRescueTwentyPlayerButton && a2 == 0x0A &&
before7a == 1 && after7a == 1 && before76 != 1 && after76 != 1) {
Log("modeHandler: click had no effect (dead 20-player button) "
"-> forcing SceneUiOpen(0x76, 0, 0) then closing 0x7A");
ForceCreateRaidWindow();
CloseModeSelectWindow(self);
Log("modeHandler: after force, window76=%d window7A=%d",
SceneUiOwnerOpen(SafeSceneRoot(), kOwnerCreateWindow),
SceneUiOwnerOpen(SafeSceneRoot(), kOwnerModeSelect));
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 3. GetMyRaid void* __fastcall sub_17B22C0(this)
// The create-window entry is only reached when this returns NULL.
// Only the create-raid button caller is logged; this getter has 65 call
// sites and must not spam the log.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// NOTE ON ADDRESS CONVENTIONS -- v2 got this wrong twice, so it is spelled out:
// * The kPlan[] targets and this constant are ABSOLUTE VAs as they appear in
// the disassembly (image base 0x400000), so the runtime address is
// g_base + (kVA - kImageBase).
// * The kRva* constants above are image-relative, so the runtime address is
// simply g_base + kRva.
// Mixing the two silently produces an address that is always wrong.
static const uintptr_t kVaCreateButtonGetMyRaidCaller = 0x03262A27;
static const uintptr_t kRvaCreateButtonGetMyRaidCaller =
kVaCreateButtonGetMyRaidCaller - kImageBase;
typedef void* (__fastcall* GetMyRaidFn)(void* self);
static GetMyRaidFn g_origGetMyRaid = NULL;
static void* __fastcall Detour_GetMyRaid(void* self)
{
void* r = g_origGetMyRaid ? g_origGetMyRaid(self) : NULL;
uintptr_t ret = (uintptr_t)_ReturnAddress();
if (ret == g_base + kRvaCreateButtonGetMyRaidCaller) {
Log("GetMyRaid -> %08X caller=create-raid-button%s",
(unsigned)(uintptr_t)r,
r ? " => BLOCKED by GetMyRaid (error 49080 would be shown)"
: " => ok, entry proceeds");
}
return r;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 4. create-attack-party entry void __cdecl sub_17B1DE0(void)
// Reads the UI owner byte it will push: 0x76 = RaidCreateWindow (native),
// 0x7A = RaidSelectSingleModeWindow (90CN.dll patch).
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
typedef void (__cdecl* CreateEntryFn)(void);
static CreateEntryFn g_origCreateEntry = NULL;
static void __cdecl Detour_CreateEntry(void)
{
bool ok = false;
unsigned owner = SafeReadByte(kRvaOwnerByte, &ok);
Log("createEntry 0x17B1DE0 ENTER uiOwner=%s (0x%02X: %s)",
ok ? "" : "?",
owner,
owner == 0x7A ? "RaidSelectSingleModeWindow, 90CN patch ACTIVE"
: owner == 0x76 ? "RaidCreateWindow, 90CN patch NOT active"
: ok ? "unexpected owner byte"
: "unreadable");
// sub_17B1DE0 dispatches on the scene type; log it so we know which path
// the native code will take.
void* scene = SafeGetScene();
if (scene) {
int st = SafeSceneType(scene);
Log("createEntry scene=%08X sceneType=%d (0x%X) idx=sceneType-0x17=%d %s",
(unsigned)(uintptr_t)scene, st, (unsigned)st, st - 0x17,
(st - 0x17) >= 0 && (st - 0x17) <= 0x13
? "IN jump-table range" : "OUT of range -> direct path");
} else {
Log("createEntry GetScene() returned NULL");
}
// NOTE: SceneUiOpen (sub_2FDD1A0) may run a modal loop, so the matching
// EXIT line can legitimately appear only after the window is closed.
LogWindowState("createEntry before-open :");
if (g_origCreateEntry) g_origCreateEntry();
LogWindowState("createEntry after-return:");
Log("createEntry 0x17B1DE0 EXIT");
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 5. C2S 664 CREATE_RAID sender sub_1B49240
// Calling convention not confirmed, so use a convention-agnostic naked
// detour: log, then JMP (not call) into the trampoline so the original's
// own `ret N` still performs the stack cleanup.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void* g_tramp664 = NULL;
extern "C" void Log664Entry(uint32_t a1, uint32_t a2)
{
// sub_1B49240 is NOT a dedicated 664 sender: it is a window message
// handler whose second argument selects the message. Only message 0x0A
// reaches the 664 build (the native code does `cmp ecx, 0xa` at entry).
// Everything else is an ordinary UI message and would flood the log --
// the v4 run produced 110 KB of it from messages 0xC/0x12/0x13 alone.
if (a2 != 0x0A) return;
Log("createRaid664 COMMIT msg=0x0A arg1=0x%X (building the C2S 664 packet)",
(unsigned)a1);
}
extern "C" __declspec(naked) void Detour_664()
{
__asm {
pushad
mov eax, [esp + 36] // arg1 (after pushad: +32 = retaddr)
mov ecx, [esp + 40] // arg2
push ecx
push eax
call Log664Entry
add esp, 8
popad
jmp dword ptr [g_tramp664]
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 6. The packet-body cursor, and the four v11 observe-only hooks
//
// Every S2C handler in this client reads its body through ONE global cursor:
//
// 0x052F8500 cursor -- pointer INTO the current packet body
// 0x052F8504 remaining -- bytes left (each reader subtracts its width)
//
// and every read advances it. So at a handler's entry the cursor is already
// positioned on the field that handler is about to read, which is what lets
// these hooks observe the wire format without touching the reader primitives
// (sub_34E3970 u8 / sub_34E39E0 u16 / sub_34E3A50 u32) at all.
//
// These are ABSOLUTE VAs, so they are resolved with Va().
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static const uintptr_t kVaCursor = 0x052F8500;
static const uintptr_t kVaRemaining = 0x052F8504;
// 0x7C inside a raid member object -- the object's own member-count field, read
// next to the wire count purely so the two can be compared in the same line.
static const size_t kMemberObjCountOffset = 0x7C;
// 0xE1E inside the op1359 manager structure -- the flag byte sub_A42AB0 sets.
static const size_t kRaidInfoFlagOffset = 0xE1E;
// Per-hook line budget. 591 and 17BF120 can run once per packet, so each hook
// stops logging here and returns silently; Log() keeps its own, larger, global
// cap on top of this.
static const LONG kHookLogCap = 3000;
// True while the hook still has budget. The unguarded read is deliberate: the
// counter only ever grows, so the worst a race can do is let a few extra lines
// through.
static bool UnderCap(volatile LONG* counter, LONG cap)
{
if (*counter >= cap) return false;
return InterlockedIncrement(counter) <= cap;
}
// One-shot notice, so a truncated session is visible in the log instead of
// silently missing lines -- and so the call volume beyond the cap is at least
// bounded rather than unknown.
static void CapNotice(volatile LONG* raised, const char* tag,
volatile LONG* calls)
{
if (InterlockedExchange(raised, 1) == 0)
Log("%s log cap %d lines reached; further calls are not logged "
"(calls so far: %d)", tag, (int)kHookLogCap, (int)*calls);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 6a. 0x01D71CA0 -- S2C opcode 591 (0x24F): raid object / roster handler entry
//
// [591] key=0x00170001 mode=3 cur=1AF86C0 rem=118
//
// raid_key and mode are the first two u32s of the body, and the cursor is
// already on the first of them when this handler is entered.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void* g_trampRaidObj591 = NULL;
static volatile LONG g_calls591 = 0;
static volatile LONG g_lines591 = 0;
static volatile LONG g_capNote591 = 0;
extern "C" void LogRaidObj591(void)
{
InterlockedIncrement(&g_calls591);
if (!UnderCap(&g_lines591, kHookLogCap)) {
CapNotice(&g_capNote591, "[591]", &g_calls591);
return;
}
uint32_t cur = 0, rem = 0, key = 0, mode = 0;
bool okCur = SafeReadU32(Va(kVaCursor), &cur);
SafeReadU32(Va(kVaRemaining), &rem);
bool okBody = okCur && SafeReadU32(cur, &key) && SafeReadU32(cur + 4, &mode);
if (okBody) {
Log("[591] key=0x%08X mode=%u cur=%08X rem=%u", key, mode, cur, rem);
} else if (okCur) {
Log("[591] key=? mode=? cur=%08X rem=%u (body unreadable at the cursor)",
cur, rem);
} else {
Log("[591] key=? mode=? cursor[%08X] unreadable in this process",
(unsigned)Va(kVaCursor));
}
}
extern "C" __declspec(naked) void Detour_RaidObj591()
{
__asm {
pushad
call LogRaidObj591 // no arguments: the logger reads the cursor
popad // pushad/popad puts every register back,
// including esp, exactly as it was
jmp dword ptr [g_trampRaidObj591]
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 6b. 0x017BF120 -- member array reader
//
// [17BF120] obj=0x12345678 count_u8=1 count_u32=0x00000001 objcount=0 ...
//
// obj = the reader's first stack argument: [esp+4] at entry, which is
// [esp+36] once pushad has pushed the eight registers.
// count_u8 = the BYTE the cursor is sitting on. The server writes this count
// with a single writeByte (BuildMemberRefreshMode3Body /
// BuildRaidObjectMode0Body), and this reader's own read sequence
// contains u16 reads, never a u32 read of the count -- so the u8 is
// the meaningful width and the u32 is only kept beside it as a
// cross-check (it also exposes an unaligned read).
// objcount = *(u8*)(obj + 0x7C), the object's own count field, for comparison.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void* g_trampMemberArray = NULL;
static volatile LONG g_callsMembers = 0;
static volatile LONG g_linesMembers = 0;
static volatile LONG g_capNoteMembers = 0;
extern "C" void LogMemberArray(unsigned obj)
{
InterlockedIncrement(&g_callsMembers);
if (!UnderCap(&g_linesMembers, kHookLogCap)) {
CapNotice(&g_capNoteMembers, "[17BF120]", &g_callsMembers);
return;
}
uint32_t cur = 0, rem = 0, count32 = 0;
unsigned count8 = 0, objcount = 0;
bool okCur = SafeReadU32(Va(kVaCursor), &cur);
SafeReadU32(Va(kVaRemaining), &rem);
bool okC8 = okCur && SafeReadU8(cur, &count8);
bool okC32 = okCur && SafeReadU32(cur, &count32);
bool okObj = (obj != 0) && SafeReadU8((uintptr_t)obj + kMemberObjCountOffset,
&objcount);
if (okC8 && okC32 && okObj) {
Log("[17BF120] obj=0x%08X count_u8=%u count_u32=0x%08X objcount=%u "
"cur=%08X rem=%u", obj, count8, count32, objcount, cur, rem);
} else if (!okCur) {
Log("[17BF120] obj=0x%08X count_u8=? count_u32=? objcount=%u "
"cursor[%08X] unreadable in this process", obj, objcount,
(unsigned)Va(kVaCursor));
} else {
Log("[17BF120] obj=0x%08X cur=%08X rem=%u PARTIAL "
"ok[count_u8=%u count_u32=%u obj+7C=%u]",
obj, cur, rem, okC8 ? 1u : 0u, okC32 ? 1u : 0u, okObj ? 1u : 0u);
}
}
extern "C" __declspec(naked) void Detour_MemberArray()
{
__asm {
pushad
mov eax, [esp + 36] // first stack argument = object pointer
push eax
call LogMemberArray
add esp, 4
popad
jmp dword ptr [g_trampMemberArray]
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 6c. 0x00A42AB0 -- tail-call target of the class-0 op1359 handler
//
// sub_1D3A150 -> sub_A42AB0, whose whole body is
// mov byte ptr [ecx+0xE1E], 1
// ret
//
// ecx is a large manager structure (NOT the raid object), so only that one flag
// byte is read, and only its value BEFORE the original instruction runs.
//
// [A42AB0] mgr=0x0ABCDEF0 flag_before=0
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void* g_trampTailFlag1359 = NULL;
static volatile LONG g_calls1359 = 0;
static volatile LONG g_lines1359 = 0;
static volatile LONG g_capNote1359 = 0;
extern "C" void LogTailFlag1359(unsigned mgr)
{
InterlockedIncrement(&g_calls1359);
if (!UnderCap(&g_lines1359, kHookLogCap)) {
CapNotice(&g_capNote1359, "[A42AB0]", &g_calls1359);
return;
}
unsigned flag = 0;
if (mgr && SafeReadU8((uintptr_t)mgr + kRaidInfoFlagOffset, &flag)) {
Log("[A42AB0] mgr=0x%08X flag_before=%u", mgr, flag);
} else {
Log("[A42AB0] mgr=0x%08X flag_before=? (unreadable)", mgr);
}
}
extern "C" __declspec(naked) void Detour_TailFlag1359()
{
__asm {
pushad
push ecx // ecx = the manager structure
call LogTailFlag1359
add esp, 4
popad // ecx is restored, so the relocated
// `mov [ecx+0xE1E],1` sees the real pointer
jmp dword ptr [g_trampTailFlag1359]
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 6d. 0x017BDF60 -- raid UI refresh notification
//
// [17BDF60] caller=0x01D7229D
//
// The caller's return address is the original [esp] -- [esp+32] once pushad has
// pushed the eight registers.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void* g_trampUiRefresh = NULL;
static volatile LONG g_callsRefresh = 0;
static volatile LONG g_linesRefresh = 0;
static volatile LONG g_capNoteRefresh = 0;
extern "C" void LogUiRefresh(unsigned caller)
{
InterlockedIncrement(&g_callsRefresh);
if (!UnderCap(&g_linesRefresh, kHookLogCap)) {
CapNotice(&g_capNoteRefresh, "[17BDF60]", &g_callsRefresh);
return;
}
Log("[17BDF60] caller=0x%08X", caller);
}
extern "C" __declspec(naked) void Detour_UiRefresh()
{
__asm {
pushad
mov eax, [esp + 32] // [esp] at entry = our caller's return
push eax
call LogUiRefresh
add esp, 4
popad
jmp dword ptr [g_trampUiRefresh]
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Hook table
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static const BYTE kSig_ModeSelect[] = {
0x55, 0x8B, 0xEC, 0x6A, 0xFF, 0x68, 0xA4, 0x08, 0xD9, 0x03,
0x64, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x50, 0x83, 0xEC, 0x44 };
static const BYTE kSig_Action[] = {
0x55, 0x8B, 0xEC, 0x53, 0x8B, 0x5D, 0x08, 0x88, 0x1D, 0x64,
0xDA, 0x0D, 0x05, 0xE8 };
static const BYTE kSig_GetMyRaid[] = {
0x56, 0x8B, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7E, 0x08, 0x00, 0x75, 0x11, 0x8B,
0x46, 0x04, 0x83, 0xF8, 0xFF, 0x74, 0x09, 0x50, 0xE8 };
static const BYTE kSig_CreateEntry[] = {
0xE8, 0x8B, 0x0C, 0x54, 0x00, 0x8B, 0xC8, 0xE8, 0x94, 0x20,
0xAB, 0x00, 0x83, 0xC0, 0xE9, 0x83, 0xF8, 0x13, 0x77, 0x0E };
static const BYTE kSig_664[] = {
0x55, 0x8B, 0xEC, 0x6A, 0xFF, 0x68, 0xD8, 0x78, 0xD3, 0x03,
0x64, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x50, 0x83, 0xEC, 0x34 };
// Native prologue of SceneUiOpen. NOTE: 90CN.dll detours this same function,
// so in the live process the first byte will be E9 and this signature will NOT
// match -- InstallHookEx() detects that and chains instead. The signature is
// kept so the hook is refused outright on any other build.
static const BYTE kSig_SceneUiOpen[] = {
0x55, 0x8B, 0xEC, 0x6A, 0xFF, 0x68, 0x68, 0x9A, 0xEC, 0x03,
0x64, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x50, 0x83, 0xEC, 0x34 };
// Raid mode-select window message handler. Native prologue only -- nothing
// else hooks this one, so a signature match is required.
static const BYTE kSig_ModeHandler[] = {
0x55, 0x8B, 0xEC, 0x6A, 0xFF, 0x68, 0xC8, 0xC2, 0xDD, 0x03,
0x64, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x50, 0x83, 0xEC, 0x08 };
// ---- v11 targets ---------------------------------------------------------
// The three SEH prologues are signed over 10 bytes -- the 5 that the trampoline
// relays AND the 5 (`68 imm32`) that stay in place and are executed when the
// trampoline returns to target+5. A match therefore proves both halves of the
// patch. The leaf is signed over exactly the 7 bytes the E9 replaces.
// Verified against client-patch\bin\DNF.exe:
// 01D71CA0 55 8B EC 6A FF 68 FE A3 D6 03 push ebp / mov ebp,esp / push -1 / push 3D6A3FE
// 017BF120 55 8B EC 6A FF 68 73 76 CE 03 push ebp / mov ebp,esp / push -1 / push 3CE7673
// 00A42AB0 C6 81 1E 0E 00 00 01 mov byte ptr [ecx+0xE1E], 1
// 017BDF60 55 8B EC 6A FF 68 60 74 CE 03 push ebp / mov ebp,esp / push -1 / push 3CE7460
static const BYTE kSig_RaidObj591[] = {
0x55, 0x8B, 0xEC, 0x6A, 0xFF, 0x68, 0xFE, 0xA3, 0xD6, 0x03 };
static const BYTE kSig_MemberArray[] = {
0x55, 0x8B, 0xEC, 0x6A, 0xFF, 0x68, 0x73, 0x76, 0xCE, 0x03 };
static const BYTE kSig_TailFlag1359[] = {
0xC6, 0x81, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
0xC3 }; // + the `ret` the trampoline falls into at target+7
static const BYTE kSig_UiRefresh[] = {
0x55, 0x8B, 0xEC, 0x6A, 0xFF, 0x68, 0x60, 0x74, 0xCE, 0x03 };
struct Plan {
uintptr_t va;
const char* name;
const BYTE* sig;
size_t sigLen;
size_t patchLen;
const BYTE* lens; // per-instruction lengths covering patchLen
size_t lensCount;
void* detour;
void** slot;
bool allowChained; // tolerate an existing E9 hook at the target
};
// The lens tables describe the EXACT instruction boundaries of each prologue.
// A wrong table is caught by RelocateCopy refusing the shape, never by a crash.
static const BYTE kLens_E[] = { 1, 2, 2 }; // 55 | 8B EC | 6A FF (patchLen 5)
static const BYTE kLens_F[] = { 7 }; // C6 81 1E 0E 00 00 01
// Arithmetic check of the v11 length tables, run at every startup.
//
// These prologues contain no relative operand, so the relocated copy must come
// out byte-identical; on top of that this asserts the three properties the
// install depends on:
// * sum(lens) == patchLen, the invariant InstallHook() enforces;
// * the trampoline's tail jump resolves to target+patchLen -- for the three
// SEH prologues that is target+5, i.e. the address of the `68 imm32` that
// was NOT patched, so the original instruction is what runs next;
// * the byte at that address really is that instruction (0x68 for the three
// SEH prologues, 0xC3 for the leaf), which is what makes the return safe.
static bool SelfTestRelocatorNewTargets()
{
struct Case {
uintptr_t va;
const BYTE* sig;
size_t sigLen;
size_t patchLen;
const BYTE* lens;
size_t lensCount;
BYTE inPlaceOpcode; // what sits at target+patchLen
const char* name; // kept last on purpose: tools/_raidprobe_check.py
// parses `{ 0xVA, "name", kSig_, sizeof, len,`
// rows out of kPlan, and this table must not
// look like one of them.
};
const Case cases[] = {
{ 0x01D71CA0, kSig_RaidObj591, sizeof(kSig_RaidObj591), 5,
kLens_E, 3, 0x68, "raidObj591" },
{ 0x017BF120, kSig_MemberArray, sizeof(kSig_MemberArray), 5,
kLens_E, 3, 0x68, "memberArray" },
{ 0x00A42AB0, kSig_TailFlag1359, sizeof(kSig_TailFlag1359), 7,
kLens_F, 1, 0xC3, "tailFlag1359" },
{ 0x017BDF60, kSig_UiRefresh, sizeof(kSig_UiRefresh), 5,
kLens_E, 3, 0x68, "uiRefresh" },
};
const uintptr_t dstVa = 0x1C310000;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) {
const Case& c = cases[i];
size_t relocLen = 0;
for (size_t k = 0; k < c.lensCount; k++) {
if (c.lens[k] == 0 || c.lens[k] > 8) return false;
relocLen += c.lens[k];
}
if (relocLen != c.patchLen) return false; // InstallHook invariant
if (c.sigLen <= c.patchLen) return false; // sig must also cover the
// in-place continuation
if (c.sig[c.patchLen] != c.inPlaceOpcode) return false;
BYTE dst[24] = { 0 };
if (!RelocateCopy(c.sig, dst, c.va, dstVa, c.lens, c.lensCount))
return false;
for (size_t j = 0; j < relocLen; j++)
if (dst[j] != c.sig[j]) return false; // no relative operand
dst[relocLen] = 0xE9;
*(int32_t*)(dst + relocLen + 1) =
(int32_t)((c.va + relocLen) - (dstVa + relocLen + 5));
int32_t rel = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) ((BYTE*)&rel)[j] = dst[relocLen + 1 + j];
uintptr_t back = dstVa + relocLen + 5 + (intptr_t)rel;
if (back != c.va + c.patchLen) return false; // returns to target+patchLen
// Printed per target, because "where does the trampoline return to" is
// the one property that decides whether the in-place bytes still make
// sense: sum(lens) == patchLen means the relayed bytes and the patched
// bytes are the same 5 (or 7), so control comes back exactly on the
// instruction that was NOT patched.
Log("v11 lens check: %-14s va=%08X patchLen=%u sum(lens)=%u "
"relayed=%u trampoline tail-jmp -> target+%u (=%08X) in-place byte "
"%02X at +%u", c.name, (unsigned)c.va, (unsigned)c.patchLen,
(unsigned)relocLen, (unsigned)relocLen, (unsigned)(back - c.va),
(unsigned)back, c.sig[c.patchLen], (unsigned)c.patchLen);
}
return true;
}
static const Plan kPlan[] = {
{ 0x01EF2C70, "modeSelectHandler", kSig_ModeSelect, sizeof(kSig_ModeSelect), 5,
kLens_A, 3, (void*)&Detour_ModeSelect, (void**)&g_origModeSelect, false },
{ 0x03417020, "action3417020", kSig_Action, sizeof(kSig_Action), 7,
kLens_B, 4, (void*)&Detour_Action, (void**)&g_origAction, false },
{ 0x017B22C0, "GetMyRaid", kSig_GetMyRaid, sizeof(kSig_GetMyRaid), 7,
kLens_C, 3, (void*)&Detour_GetMyRaid, (void**)&g_origGetMyRaid, false },
{ 0x017B1DE0, "createEntry", kSig_CreateEntry, sizeof(kSig_CreateEntry), 5,
kLens_D, 1, (void*)&Detour_CreateEntry,(void**)&g_origCreateEntry,false },
{ 0x01B49240, "createRaid664", kSig_664, sizeof(kSig_664), 5,
kLens_A, 3, (void*)&Detour_664, (void**)&g_tramp664, false },
// allowChained = true: 90CN.dll owns SceneUiOpen too, so this one is
// installed as an observe-only tail-jump instead of a normal hook. `slot`
// is unused there because the detour never calls the original.
{ 0x02FDD1A0, "sceneUiOpen", kSig_SceneUiOpen, sizeof(kSig_SceneUiOpen), 5,
kLens_A, 3, (void*)&Detour_SceneUiOpen, NULL, true },
// Mode-select window handler: this is the one that proves which named
// button was clicked and rescues the dead 闁哄拋鍣ｉ埀顒佺鑶╃€?branch.
{ 0x010384A0, "raidModeHandler", kSig_ModeHandler, sizeof(kSig_ModeHandler), 5,
kLens_A, 3, (void*)&Detour_RaidModeHandler,
(void**)&g_origRaidModeHandler, false },
// ---- v11: four observe-only observers on the S2C raid path ------------
// The three SEH prologues are patched with 5 bytes -- the E9 lands exactly on
// the `push imm32` boundary -- and the trampoline relays those same 5 bytes
// and returns to target+5, where the ORIGINAL `push imm32` executes in
// place. The leaf at 0x00A42AB0 is one 7-byte instruction and is patched
// with 7, not 5. Every entry satisfies sum(lens) == patchLen, so
// InstallHook() is exactly the shared implementation it always was.
{ 0x01D71CA0, "raidObj591", kSig_RaidObj591, sizeof(kSig_RaidObj591), 5,
kLens_E, 3, (void*)&Detour_RaidObj591, (void**)&g_trampRaidObj591, false },
{ 0x017BF120, "memberArray", kSig_MemberArray, sizeof(kSig_MemberArray), 5,
kLens_E, 3, (void*)&Detour_MemberArray,(void**)&g_trampMemberArray, false },
{ 0x00A42AB0, "tailFlag1359", kSig_TailFlag1359,sizeof(kSig_TailFlag1359),7,
kLens_F, 1, (void*)&Detour_TailFlag1359,(void**)&g_trampTailFlag1359,false },
{ 0x017BDF60, "uiRefresh", kSig_UiRefresh, sizeof(kSig_UiRefresh), 5,
kLens_E, 3, (void*)&Detour_UiRefresh, (void**)&g_trampUiRefresh, false },
};
// NOT in kPlan[], on purpose: the claim patch at 0x01D7222C is a plain byte
// rewrite with no detour, so it has no trampoline, no lens table, no signature
// slot and no install step to share. It lives in its own section further down
// ("THE CLAIM PATCH"), is applied once from the same startup thread, and is
// counted by nothing in the `armed: N/M hooks installed` line above.
// ===========================================================================
// PLAN DRY-RUN -- the self-test, and the only part of this file that must never
// run inside the game
// ===========================================================================
// In the self-test host (a plain 32-bit process that does not contain the game
// image) the live install correctly fails closed on every signature, so the
// log would only ever say "0/N hooks installed". That proves the guard works
// but says nothing about the plan itself, and the plan is where the real risk
// is: a wrong VA, a wrong length table, a wrong patchLen, a detour that does
// not survive being called.
//
// So the same plan is replayed against the REAL bytes of DNF.exe read from
// disk (VA -> file offset through the PE section table), each hook is
// installed into a private copy of its target page through the SAME
// InstallHook() the game uses, and the four v11 observers are then executed
// once each through their own installed hook, with a synthetic packet cursor
// mapped at the address they read.
//
// Guarantees:
// * nothing is written to any file -- DNF.exe is opened read-only;
// * no game memory is touched: the only memory that changes is private pages
// inside the self-test process;
// * it cannot be reached inside DNF.exe (see HostLooksLikeDnf);
// * every page it allocates is deliberately kept alive, so a stray later
// call can only land in a live page.
// ===========================================================================
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Minimal read-only PE access, so the 82 MB client image is never mapped or
// loaded: the section table plus a handful of 16-byte reads is all that is
// needed, which matters in a 32-bit host.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
struct PeSection { uint32_t va, vsize, raw, rsize; };
static PeSection g_peSections[16];
static int g_peSectionCount = 0;
static uint32_t g_peImageBase = 0;
static bool g_peOk = false;
static void PathJoin(wchar_t* out /* MAX_PATH */, const wchar_t* dir,
const wchar_t* name)
{
size_t i = 0;
for (; dir[i] && i < MAX_PATH - 1; i++) out[i] = dir[i];
for (size_t j = 0; name[j] && i < MAX_PATH - 1; j++) out[i++] = name[j];
out[i] = 0;
}
static bool FileExists(const wchar_t* path)
{
DWORD a = GetFileAttributesW(path);
return a != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES && !(a & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY);
}
// Where the client image lives, for the dry-run self-test only. There is no
// environment override any more: the candidates below cover both layouts this
// module is ever built into -- client-patch\Release\90CN.dll (the project's
// output directory) and <game dir>\90CN.dll (deployed next to the client).
static bool FindDnfExe(wchar_t* out /* MAX_PATH */)
{
out[0] = 0;
if (g_selfDir[0]) {
static const wchar_t* kRel[] = {
L"..\\..\\bin\\DNF.exe", // probe\Release\ -> client-patch\bin
L"..\\bin\\DNF.exe",
L"DNF.exe",
};
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
PathJoin(out, g_selfDir, kRel[i]);
if (FileExists(out)) return true;
}
}
// Deployed layout: RaidProbe.dll sitting next to DNF.exe.
wchar_t host[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
if (GetModuleFileNameW(NULL, host, MAX_PATH)) {
wchar_t* slash = host;
for (wchar_t* p = host; *p; ++p) if (*p == L'\\') slash = p;
if (*slash == L'\\') {
*(slash + 1) = 0;
PathJoin(out, host, L"DNF.exe");
if (FileExists(out)) return true;
}
}
out[0] = 0;
return false;
}
static bool ReadFileAt(HANDLE h, uint32_t off, void* dst, DWORD n)
{
DWORD got = 0;
SetLastError(NO_ERROR);
if (SetFilePointer(h, (LONG)off, NULL, FILE_BEGIN) ==
INVALID_SET_FILE_POINTER && GetLastError() != NO_ERROR)
return false;
return ReadFile(h, dst, n, &got, NULL) && got == n;
}
static bool LoadPeMap(HANDLE h)
{
BYTE hdr[0x400] = { 0 };
if (!ReadFileAt(h, 0, hdr, sizeof(hdr))) return false;
if (hdr[0] != 'M' || hdr[1] != 'Z') return false;
uint32_t pe = *(uint32_t*)(hdr + 0x3C);
if (pe + 0x100 > sizeof(hdr)) return false;
if (hdr[pe] != 'P' || hdr[pe + 1] != 'E') return false;
unsigned nsec = *(uint16_t*)(hdr + pe + 6);
unsigned optSz = *(uint16_t*)(hdr + pe + 20);
unsigned opt = pe + 24;
if (nsec == 0 || nsec > 16) return false;
if (opt + optSz + 4 > sizeof(hdr)) return false;
g_peImageBase = *(uint32_t*)(hdr + opt + 28);
unsigned secOff = opt + optSz;
if (secOff + nsec * 40 > sizeof(hdr)) return false;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nsec; i++) {
const BYTE* s = hdr + secOff + i * 40;
g_peSections[i].vsize = *(uint32_t*)(s + 8);
g_peSections[i].va = *(uint32_t*)(s + 12);
g_peSections[i].rsize = *(uint32_t*)(s + 16);
g_peSections[i].raw = *(uint32_t*)(s + 20);
}
g_peSectionCount = (int)nsec;
g_peOk = true;
return true;
}
static bool PeVaToOffset(uint32_t va, uint32_t* out)
{
if (!g_peOk || va < g_peImageBase) return false;
uint32_t rva = va - g_peImageBase;
for (int i = 0; i < g_peSectionCount; i++) {
const PeSection& s = g_peSections[i];
uint32_t span = s.vsize > s.rsize ? s.vsize : s.rsize;
if (rva >= s.va && rva < s.va + span) {
*out = s.raw + (rva - s.va);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
// ===========================================================================
// THE CLAIM PATCH -- one 5-byte rewrite, NOT a hook
// ===========================================================================
// 0x01D7222C sits in the mode-3 branch of the 0x24F (raid object / roster)
// handler, behind this guard:
//
// 0x01D72219 mov eax, [ebp-0x14] ; raid_key
// 0x01D7221E shr ecx, 0x10 ; raid_key >> 16
// 0x01D72221 cmp ecx, ebx ; ebx = this client's own channel
// 0x01D72223 jne 0x01D7225C ; not our channel -> skip the block
// 0x01D7222B push eax ; the call's argument -- 1 byte BEFORE
// ; the patch, so it is NOT covered
// 0x01D7222C call 0x017C3470 ; equal -> "claim me as this raid"
//
// sub_17C3470 is the setter that writes [sceneOwner+4] = raid_key and swaps the
// raid window around it (closes 0x76/0x74/0x77, opens 0x75). With that call
// gone, browsing somebody else's raid still shows its roster, but the client no
// longer adopts that raid as its own.
//
// Of the setter's three call sites only this one is patched: 0x01D0438B in
// sub_1D04340 (the 664 response handler) is the legitimate "I really am a
// member" path, and 0x01D71EF4 is mode 0 of this very handler -- the server's
// broadcastRuntimeRaidCreate, which only members receive and where the setting
// may be load-bearing. Neither is touched.
//
// Shape: the whole instruction is `E8 rel32` and patchLen is 5, so all five
// bytes of it are replaced -- but the replacement is `pop eax` + four NOPs, NOT
// five NOPs, because the argument pushed at 0x01D7222B would otherwise be left
// on the stack (see the kClaimAfter comment below for the full argument). There
// is nothing to relocate, no trampoline to publish and no half instruction to
// leave behind -- which is also why this is not a kPlan[] row (see the note
// under kPlan[]).
//
// It changes behaviour rather than observing it, so it is gated by
// raidProbeConfig::kApplyClaimPatch and FAIL-CLOSED: the 5 bytes are read first
// and compared with the expected original, and anything else refuses the
// patch and leaves the client byte-for-byte untouched.
//
// 0x01D7222C before E8 3F 12 A5 FF (call 0x017C3470)
// after 58 90 90 90 90 (pop eax -- consumes the
// argument; then four NOPs)
// ===========================================================================
static const uintptr_t kVaClaimPatch = 0x01D7222C;
static const size_t kClaimPatchLen = 5;
static const BYTE kClaimBefore[kClaimPatchLen] = {
0xE8, 0x3F, 0x12, 0xA5, 0xFF };
// The replacement is `pop eax` + four NOPs -- NOT five NOPs. This is not a
// style choice, and it must not be "tidied up" back to 90 90 90 90 90:
//
// * 0x01D7222B is `push eax`, the ARGUMENT of the call being removed, and it
// sits one byte BEFORE this patch, so it stays in the code.
// * sub_17C3470 is CALLEE-CLEANUP: its only exit is `mov esp,ebp; pop ebp;
// ret 4` at 0x017C3703, and all three call sites push exactly one argument
// and never `add esp,4` afterwards. So the CALLEE is what pops that dword.
// * Remove the call with NOPs and nobody pops it: esp stays 4 bytes low from
// 0x01D72231 until the epilogue at 0x01D722A2, whose register restores are
// esp-relative (`pop ecx / pop edi / pop esi / pop ebx`) -- pop ecx would
// eat the orphaned argument instead of the /GS cookie, and the handler's
// caller would get edi/esi/ebx back one slot out (saved ebx thrown away by
// `mov esp,ebp`).
// * `pop eax` is the one-byte instruction that consumes exactly that
// argument. eax already held the pushed value (it was pushed FROM eax), and
// `pop` touches no flags, so no register or flag state changes at all.
//
// The self-test's "claim-patch verify" line asserts that byte 0 really is 0x58,
// so a silent revert to NOPs shows up as *** FAIL *** in the log.
static const BYTE kClaimAfter[kClaimPatchLen] = {
0x58, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90 };
// Instruction widths of the replacement. Both 0x58 and 0x90 are ONE-BYTE
// instructions, so the replacement occupies exactly the same five bytes as the
// `E8 rel32` it replaces and the next instruction still starts at 0x01D72231.
// There is no disassembler in this module, so the widths are stated and the
// dry-run asserts that they add up to kClaimPatchLen.
static const BYTE kClaimAfterWidth[kClaimPatchLen] = { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 };
// What the image holds at 0x01D72231, i.e. the instruction that must still be
// there after the patch: 8B 0D 64 27 1B 05 = mov ecx, [0x51B2764].
static const BYTE kClaimNextByte = 0x8B;
// The expected setter, i.e. what that rel32 has to decode to.
static const uintptr_t kVaClaimSetter = 0x017C3470;
static bool ConfigPatchClaim() { return raidProbeConfig::kApplyClaimPatch; }
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// The live patch. Called ONCE, from the inside-DNF branch of InstallThread only
// (see the call site), so it can never rewrite memory that is not the client.
// Every outcome is logged, including the refusal, with the bytes actually read.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void ApplyClaimPatch()
{
if (!ConfigPatchClaim()) {
Log("[claim-patch] disabled (raidProbeConfig::kApplyClaimPatch is false)");
return;
}
uintptr_t at = Va(kVaClaimPatch);
BYTE got[kClaimPatchLen] = { 0 };
if (!SafeReadBytes(at, got, kClaimPatchLen)) {
Log("[claim-patch] REFUSED: bytes at %08X are unreadable in this "
"process, expected E8 3F 12 A5 FF - nothing patched",
(unsigned)kVaClaimPatch);
return;
}
char gotHex[kClaimPatchLen * 3] = { 0 };
HexBytes(got, kClaimPatchLen, gotHex);
bool match = true;
for (size_t i = 0; i < kClaimPatchLen; i++)
if (got[i] != kClaimBefore[i]) { match = false; break; }
if (!match) {
Log("[claim-patch] REFUSED: bytes at %08X are %s, expected "
"E8 3F 12 A5 FF - nothing patched", (unsigned)kVaClaimPatch,
gotHex);
return;
}
bool patched = false;
__try {
DWORD old = 0;
if (VirtualProtect((void*)at, kClaimPatchLen,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &old)) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < kClaimPatchLen; i++)
((volatile BYTE*)at)[i] = kClaimAfter[i];
// Flush while the page is still writable, then put the original
// protection back.
FlushInstructionCache(GetCurrentProcess(), (void*)at,
kClaimPatchLen);
VirtualProtect((void*)at, kClaimPatchLen, old, &old);
patched = true;
}
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { patched = false; }
if (!patched) {
Log("[claim-patch] FAILED: VirtualProtect/write refused at %08X - "
"nothing patched", (unsigned)at);
return;
}
char wantHex[kClaimPatchLen * 3] = { 0 };
HexBytes(kClaimAfter, kClaimPatchLen, wantHex);
Log("[claim-patch] replaced call at %08X: %s -> %s (pop eax consumes the "
"pushed arg; setter uses ret 4)", (unsigned)kVaClaimPatch, gotHex,
wantHex);
// Read the site back: the log should carry the evidence that `58 90 90 90
// 90` is really in memory, not just the intent to put it there.
BYTE now[kClaimPatchLen] = { 0 };
if (SafeReadBytes(at, now, kClaimPatchLen)) {
char nowHex[kClaimPatchLen * 3] = { 0 };
HexBytes(now, kClaimPatchLen, nowHex);
bool stuck = true;
for (size_t i = 0; i < kClaimPatchLen; i++)
if (now[i] != kClaimAfter[i]) { stuck = false; break; }
Log("[claim-patch] read-back at VA %08X (runtime %08X) = %s %s",
(unsigned)kVaClaimPatch, (unsigned)at, nowHex,
stuck ? "(patch is in place)" : "(MISMATCH - write did not stick)");
} else {
Log("[claim-patch] read-back at runtime %08X unreadable", (unsigned)at);
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Read-only dry-run of the same site, against the DNF.exe image ON DISK.
//
// It reuses the PE map the plan dry-run has already loaded (PeVaToOffset +
// ReadFileAt) and proves four things without touching a byte of memory:
// * 0x01D7222C resolves to a real file offset in this image;
// * the five bytes there are exactly the ones the patch insists on;
// * they really decode to `call 0x017C3470` -- i.e. this is the setter's call
// site, and not merely five coincidentally-equal bytes;
// * the REPLACEMENT (`pop eax` + 4 NOPs) still occupies exactly five bytes, so
// the next instruction is still the image's 8B at 0x01D72231 -- printed as
// the "claim-patch verify" line, which fails if byte 0 is not 0x58.
// So the live patch's fail-closed decision can be checked from the self-test
// host, before the module goes anywhere near the game.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static bool ClaimPatchDryRun(HANDLE h)
{
BYTE got[kClaimPatchLen] = { 0 };
uint32_t off = 0;
if (!PeVaToOffset((uint32_t)kVaClaimPatch, &off) ||
!ReadFileAt(h, off, got, (DWORD)kClaimPatchLen)) {
Log("claim-patch dry-run: FAIL - VA %08X does not resolve to a file "
"offset in this image, so the live patch would REFUSE",
(unsigned)kVaClaimPatch);
return false;
}
char gotHex[kClaimPatchLen * 3] = { 0 };
char wantHex[kClaimPatchLen * 3] = { 0 };
HexBytes(got, kClaimPatchLen, gotHex);
HexBytes(kClaimBefore, kClaimPatchLen, wantHex);
bool match = true;
for (size_t i = 0; i < kClaimPatchLen; i++)
if (got[i] != kClaimBefore[i]) { match = false; break; }
if (!match) {
Log("claim-patch dry-run: FAIL - bytes at %08X = %s, expected %s; this "
"image is not the build the patch was verified against, so the live "
"patch would REFUSE and change nothing",
(unsigned)kVaClaimPatch, gotHex, wantHex);
return false;
}
Log("claim-patch dry-run: bytes at %08X = %s (MATCH)",
(unsigned)kVaClaimPatch, gotHex);
// Decode the displacement the way the CPU reads it, so the MATCH above
// cannot be satisfied by five bytes that merely happen to be equal.
int32_t rel = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) ((BYTE*)&rel)[j] = got[1 + j];
uintptr_t dest = kVaClaimPatch + 5 + (intptr_t)rel;
bool targetOk = (dest == kVaClaimSetter);
Log("claim-patch dry-run: file offset %X, %s decodes to call %08X "
"(%s)", (unsigned)off, gotHex, (unsigned)dest,
targetOk ? "the claim setter, as expected"
: "UNEXPECTED target - the live patch would still apply, "
"re-check the RE");
// --- and now the bytes this patch WRITES -------------------------------
// A second walk, of the REPLACEMENT: 0x58 (`pop eax`) and 0x90 are one-byte
// instructions, so the five of them must add up to exactly the five bytes
// the `E8 rel32` occupied -- that is what keeps the next instruction at
// 0x01D72231, the address the guard's fall-through continues from. The
// image byte there is read back and checked too, so a replacement that is
// one byte short (which would shift the whole rest of the function) or one
// byte long (which would eat the next instruction) cannot pass silently.
size_t width = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < kClaimPatchLen; i++) width += kClaimAfterWidth[i];
bool firstIsPop = (kClaimAfter[0] == 0x58);
bool restAreNop = true;
for (size_t i = 1; i < kClaimPatchLen; i++)
if (kClaimAfter[i] != 0x90) restAreNop = false;
uintptr_t nextVa = kVaClaimPatch + kClaimPatchLen;
BYTE nextByte = 0;
bool haveNext = ReadFileAt(h, off + kClaimPatchLen, &nextByte, 1);
bool verifyOk = firstIsPop && restAreNop && (width == kClaimPatchLen) &&
haveNext && (nextByte == kClaimNextByte);
Log("claim-patch verify: %08X = %02X (%s), %u bytes, next insn at %08X %s",
(unsigned)kVaClaimPatch, (unsigned)kClaimAfter[0],
firstIsPop ? "pop eax" : "NOT pop eax - the push would be orphaned",
(unsigned)width, (unsigned)nextVa,
verifyOk ? "OK" : "*** FAIL ***");
if (!verifyOk) {
Log("claim-patch verify: FAIL - first byte %s, remaining bytes %s, "
"total width %u (must equal patchLen %u), image byte at %08X = %s",
firstIsPop ? "is 58 (pop eax)" : "is NOT 58 (pop eax)",
restAreNop ? "are four NOPs" : "are NOT four NOPs",
(unsigned)width, (unsigned)kClaimPatchLen, (unsigned)nextVa,
haveNext ? (nextByte == kClaimNextByte
? "8B, as expected"
: "not 8B - the continuation moved")
: "unreadable");
return false;
}
return targetOk;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Calling into a dry-run hook.
//
// The detours are naked and must not be trusted with anything, so the checks
// are done in assembly: ebx/esi/edi are loaded with sentinels and the esp after
// the argument push is recorded, then both are tested after the call returns.
// A hook that scribbles on either -- or leaves the stack unbalanced -- is caught
// here instead of in the game.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static volatile LONG g_drySpExpected = 0;
static volatile LONG g_drySpOk = 0;
static volatile LONG g_dryRegsOk = 0;
// __cdecl, one argument: fn(arg)
extern "C" __declspec(naked) void DryRunCallCdecl(void* fn, void* arg)
{
__asm {
push ebx
push esi
push edi
mov ebx, 011111111h
mov esi, 022222222h
mov edi, 033333333h
mov eax, esp
mov g_drySpExpected, eax
mov eax, [esp + 16] // fn (12 saved bytes + return address)
mov ecx, [esp + 20] // arg
push ecx
call eax
add esp, 4
xor ecx, ecx
cmp esp, g_drySpExpected
sete cl
mov g_drySpOk, ecx
xor ecx, ecx
cmp ebx, 011111111h
jne dry_cdecl_done
cmp esi, 022222222h
jne dry_cdecl_done
cmp edi, 033333333h
jne dry_cdecl_done
mov ecx, 1
dry_cdecl_done:
mov g_dryRegsOk, ecx
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
ret
}
}
// __fastcall with the pointer in ecx: fn(ecxValue)
extern "C" __declspec(naked) void DryRunCallEcx(void* fn, void* ecxValue)
{
__asm {
push ebx
push esi
push edi
mov ebx, 011111111h
mov esi, 022222222h
mov edi, 033333333h
mov eax, esp
mov g_drySpExpected, eax
mov eax, [esp + 16] // fn
mov ecx, [esp + 20] // argument passed in ecx
call eax
xor ecx, ecx
cmp esp, g_drySpExpected
sete cl
mov g_drySpOk, ecx
xor ecx, ecx
cmp ebx, 011111111h
jne dry_ecx_done
cmp esi, 022222222h
jne dry_ecx_done
cmp edi, 033333333h
jne dry_ecx_done
mov ecx, 1
dry_ecx_done:
mov g_dryRegsOk, ecx
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
ret
}
}
// ===========================================================================
// Install every plan entry into a private copy of its real target page.
// Returns the number of hooks that installed cleanly, and logs one line per
// entry with the bytes actually read at the target.
// ===========================================================================
static void* g_dryPages[16] = { 0 };
static uint32_t g_dryRetAt[16] = { 0 }; // where the trampoline comes back to
static uint32_t g_dryInPlaceImm[16] = { 0 }; // offset of an in-place `push imm32`
static volatile LONG g_dryPushedValue = 0; // what that push actually pushed
static volatile LONG g_dryEbpMinusEsp = 0; // frame depth when the stub is reached
// The stub the dry-run puts where the rest of the game function would be.
//
// For the three SEH prologues the trampoline's tail jump lands on the ORIGINAL
// `push imm32` that was left in place at target+5 (not patched, not relayed),
// which then falls through into this stub. So the stub can measure exactly the
// two things that prove the layout:
//
// mov eax, esp
// mov edx, ebp
// sub edx, eax ; ebp-esp = 8 when the in-place push
// ; ran, 4 if it had been skipped
// mov [g_dryEbpMinusEsp], edx
// mov ecx, [esp] ; the value that push pushed
// mov [g_dryPushedValue], ecx ; must equal the image's imm32 operand
// mov esp, ebp / pop ebp / ret ; unwind the frame as the real code does
//
// It only clobbers eax/ecx/edx (caller-saved), never ebx/esi/edi/ebp, so the
// dry-run's register check stays meaningful.
static void WriteDryFrameStub(BYTE* at)
{
BYTE* p = at;
*p++ = 0x8B; *p++ = 0xC4; // mov eax, esp
*p++ = 0x8B; *p++ = 0xD5; // mov edx, ebp
*p++ = 0x29; *p++ = 0xC2; // sub edx, eax
*p++ = 0x89; *p++ = 0x15; // mov [imm32], edx
*(uint32_t*)p = (uint32_t)(uintptr_t)&g_dryEbpMinusEsp; p += 4;
*p++ = 0x8B; *p++ = 0x0C; *p++ = 0x24; // mov ecx, [esp]
*p++ = 0x89; *p++ = 0x0D; // mov [imm32], ecx
*(uint32_t*)p = (uint32_t)(uintptr_t)&g_dryPushedValue; p += 4;
*p++ = 0x8B; *p++ = 0xE5; // mov esp, ebp
*p++ = 0x5D; // pop ebp
*p++ = 0xC3; // ret
}
static int PlanDryRun(void)
{
wchar_t exe[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
if (!FindDnfExe(exe)) {
Log("dry-run: DNF.exe not found next to this module or next to the host; "
"place DNF.exe next to this module, in ..\\bin, or in ..\\..\\bin to enable the plan dry-run");
return 0;
}
char exeA[MAX_PATH * 2] = { 0 };
wchar_t full[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
const wchar_t* shown = exe;
if (GetFullPathNameW(exe, MAX_PATH, full, NULL) > 0) shown = full;
if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, shown, -1, exeA, sizeof(exeA) - 1,
NULL, NULL) <= 0) exeA[0] = 0;
HANDLE h = CreateFileW(exe, GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
if (h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
Log("dry-run: cannot open %s (win32 error %u)", exeA,
(unsigned)GetLastError());
return 0;
}
if (!LoadPeMap(h)) {
Log("dry-run: %s is not a readable PE image", exeA);
CloseHandle(h);
return 0;
}
Log("dry-run source : %s", exeA);
Log("dry-run image : PE ImageBase=%08X, %d sections, VA -> file offset via "
"the section table", (unsigned)g_peImageBase, g_peSectionCount);
int total = (int)(sizeof(kPlan) / sizeof(kPlan[0]));
int installed = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < total; i++) {
const Plan& p = kPlan[i];
size_t relocLen = 0;
for (size_t k = 0; k < p.lensCount; k++) relocLen += p.lens[k];
BYTE bytes[40] = { 0 };
uint32_t off = 0;
// Read as much as EITHER the relocation or the signature needs, plus the
// bytes that follow the patched region (the signature is usually longer
// than the relocated prologue -- 20 bytes vs 5 -- and reading only
// relocLen would compare the tail against zeros).
size_t need = (relocLen > p.sigLen ? relocLen : p.sigLen) + 8;
if (need > sizeof(bytes) || !PeVaToOffset((uint32_t)p.va, &off) ||
!ReadFileAt(h, off, bytes, (DWORD)need)) {
Log("DRYFAIL %-18s va=%08X : VA is not resolvable in this image "
"- refused", p.name, (unsigned)p.va);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(bytes, p.sig, p.sigLen) != 0) {
char got[40 * 3] = { 0 };
HexBytes(bytes, p.sigLen <= 16 ? p.sigLen : 16, got);
Log("DRYFAIL %-18s va=%08X : on-disk signature mismatch (%s) "
"- refused, nothing installed", p.name, (unsigned)p.va, got);
continue;
}
char first[40 * 3] = { 0 };
HexBytes(bytes, p.sigLen <= 16 ? p.sigLen : 16, first);
BYTE* page = (BYTE*)VirtualAlloc(NULL, 0x1000, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
if (!page) {
Log("DRYFAIL %-18s va=%08X : VirtualAlloc refused", p.name,
(unsigned)p.va);
continue;
}
for (size_t j = 0; j < relocLen; j++) page[j] = bytes[j];
for (size_t j = relocLen; j < 32; j++) page[j] = 0xCC;
// Restore the bytes that follow the patched region verbatim. They are
// NOT cosmetic: with sum(lens) == patchLen the trampoline returns to
// target+patchLen, and for the three SEH prologues that address holds
// the original `push imm32` -- which therefore really executes, both
// here and in the game.
for (size_t j = relocLen; j < need; j++) page[j] = bytes[j];
// Where control comes back to, and therefore where the dry-run stub
// belongs. `68 imm32` is 5 bytes, so execution falls through to
// target+relocLen+5 after the in-place push has run.
size_t retAt = relocLen;
if (bytes[relocLen] == 0x68) retAt = relocLen + 5;
g_dryRetAt[i] = (uint32_t)retAt;
g_dryInPlaceImm[i] = (retAt > relocLen) ? (uint32_t)(retAt - 4) : 0;
// The stub stands in for the rest of the game function. A `push ebp ;
// mov ebp,esp` frame is closed the way the real code would close it, and
// it records the evidence that the in-place instruction really ran;
// anything else (the 7-byte leaf) is simply followed by its own `ret`.
if (bytes[0] == 0x55 && bytes[1] == 0x8B && bytes[2] == 0xEC) {
WriteDryFrameStub(page + retAt);
} else {
page[retAt] = 0xC3; // ret (the leaf already ends in one)
}
bool ok;
if (p.allowChained) {
// SceneUiOpen is owned by 90CN.dll, so the live install only accepts
// a target that already starts with an E9. Synthesize that jump,
// pointing at an empty `ret` inside the same page.
page[0] = 0xE9;
*(int32_t*)(page + 1) =
(int32_t)((uintptr_t)(page + 0x100) - ((uintptr_t)page + 5));
page[0x100] = 0xC3;
ok = InstallTailJumpHook((uintptr_t)page, p.detour);
} else {
ok = InstallHook((uintptr_t)page, p.detour, p.patchLen, p.lens,
p.lensCount, p.slot);
}
if (!ok) {
Log("DRYFAIL %-18s va=%08X : dry-run install failed (relocation or "
"patch refused) - not installed", p.name, (unsigned)p.va);
continue;
}
g_dryPages[i] = page; // never freed, see the header above
installed++;
unsigned tramp = 0;
if (p.slot && *p.slot) tramp = (unsigned)(uintptr_t)*p.slot;
else if (p.allowChained) tramp = (unsigned)(uintptr_t)g_sceneUiOldDest;
Log("OK %-18s target=%08X patch=%u first=%s trampoline=%08X "
"[DRY-RUN copy]", p.name, (unsigned)p.va, (unsigned)p.patchLen,
first, tramp);
}
// The claim patch is not a hook, so it is not in the loop above -- but its
// site is still checked against the same on-disk image, so a stale VA or a
// swapped client is visible here instead of in the game.
ClaimPatchDryRun(h);
CloseHandle(h);
return installed;
}
// ===========================================================================
// Execute the four v11 observers once each, through their own installed hook.
//
// A synthetic packet cursor is mapped at exactly the address the hooks read
// (g_base + RVA), so the lines they log are deterministic and checkable:
// cursor -> body must give key=0x00170001 mode=3 for 591, the field the cursor
// is aimed at must give count=2 for 17BF120 while obj+0x7C reads 0, the flag
// byte A42AB0 replays must end up 1, and 17BDF60's caller must be THIS module.
// If the page cannot be placed, the observers log their "unreadable" path
// instead -- which is the SEH guard being exercised, not a failure.
// ===========================================================================
static int DryRunExecObservers(int* testedOut)
{
int tested = 0, passed = 0;
int inPlace = 0, inPlaceExpected = 0;
*testedOut = 0;
// Scratch object/manager structure: zero-filled, so obj+0x7C = 0 and
// flag_before = 0 are known values rather than guesses.
BYTE* scratch = (BYTE*)VirtualAlloc(NULL, 0x2000, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE,
PAGE_READWRITE);
if (!scratch) {
Log("dry-run exec: scratch page refused - execution test skipped");
return 0;
}
uintptr_t curVa = Va(kVaCursor);
uintptr_t curPg = curVa & ~(uintptr_t)0xFFF;
BYTE* fake = (BYTE*)VirtualAlloc((void*)curPg, 0x2000,
MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
if (fake) {
// one body page shared by 591 (key/mode at +0) and 17BF120 (count at
// +0x100), plus the cursor/remaining pair the hooks read first.
*(uint32_t*)(curPg + 0x1000 + 0) = 0x00170001; // raid_key
*(uint32_t*)(curPg + 0x1000 + 4) = 3; // mode
*(uint32_t*)(curPg + 0x1100) = 2; // member count = 2
*(uint32_t*)curVa = (uint32_t)(curPg + 0x1000);
*(uint32_t*)(curVa + 4) = 0x5A; // remaining
Log("dry-run exec: synthetic cursor mapped at %08X (body at %08X)",
(unsigned)curVa, (unsigned)(curPg + 0x1000));
} else {
// The page is not ours, so whatever the observers read there is whatever
// this host happens to keep at that address -- which may be readable
// garbage or may fault into the SEH guard. Either is fine: the point of
// running them here is that they RUN, not what they read.
MEMORY_BASIC_INFORMATION mbi;
if (VirtualQuery((LPCVOID)curPg, &mbi, sizeof(mbi))) {
Log("dry-run exec: cursor page %08X is already in use by this host "
"(state=%08X type=%08X), so a synthetic cursor cannot be placed "
"there", (unsigned)curPg, (unsigned)mbi.State,
(unsigned)mbi.Type);
}
Log("dry-run exec: in the game the cursor is %08X (base 00400000 + RVA "
"%X); here that address is this host's own memory, so whatever the "
"two cursor-driven observers print below is NOT packet data - read "
"it as 'the hook ran', nothing more",
(unsigned)kVaCursor, (unsigned)(kVaCursor - kImageBase));
}
int total = (int)(sizeof(kPlan) / sizeof(kPlan[0]));
for (int i = 0; i < total; i++) {
const Plan& p = kPlan[i];
bool isA = (p.va == 0x01D71CA0);
bool isB = (p.va == 0x017BF120);
bool isC = (p.va == 0x00A42AB0);
bool isD = (p.va == 0x017BDF60);
if (!(isA || isB || isC || isD)) continue;
void* page = g_dryPages[i];
if (!page) {
Log("dry-run exec: %-18s was not installed, not executed", p.name);
continue;
}
if (fake) { // aim the cursor at the field THIS observer reads
*(uint32_t*)curVa = (uint32_t)(curPg + (isB ? 0x1100 : 0x1000));
*(uint32_t*)(curVa + 4) = 0x5A;
}
volatile LONG* ctr = isA ? &g_calls591
: isB ? &g_callsMembers
: isC ? &g_calls1359 : &g_callsRefresh;
LONG before = *ctr;
g_drySpOk = 0;
g_dryRegsOk = 0;
g_dryPushedValue = 0;
g_dryEbpMinusEsp = 0;
bool noFault = true;
__try {
if (isC) DryRunCallEcx(page, scratch); // ecx = manager
else DryRunCallCdecl(page, scratch); // [esp+4] = object (B)
}
__except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
noFault = false;
}
LONG fired = *ctr - before;
bool spOk = (g_drySpOk != 0);
bool regsOk = (g_dryRegsOk != 0);
// The three SEH prologues have to come back through the ORIGINAL
// `push imm32` at target+patchLen: prove it by comparing the value that
// push left on the stack with the operand stored in the image, and by
// the frame depth (8 = three pushes, 4 if the in-place push had been
// skipped).
bool inPlaceOk = true;
if (g_dryInPlaceImm[i]) {
inPlaceExpected++;
uint32_t want = *(uint32_t*)((BYTE*)page + g_dryInPlaceImm[i]);
inPlaceOk = (g_dryPushedValue == (LONG)want) &&
(g_dryEbpMinusEsp == 8);
if (inPlaceOk) inPlace++;
Log("dry-run exec: %-18s returned to target+%u and the ORIGINAL "
"push imm32 executed: pushed=%08X image operand=%08X "
"ebp-esp=%u -> %s",
p.name, (unsigned)p.patchLen, (unsigned)g_dryPushedValue,
(unsigned)want, (unsigned)g_dryEbpMinusEsp,
inPlaceOk ? "MATCH (in place, not skipped)" : "MISMATCH");
}
tested++;
if (noFault && fired > 0 && spOk && regsOk && inPlaceOk) passed++;
Log("dry-run exec: %-18s detour=%s stack=%s callee-saved=%s%s",
p.name,
fired > 0 ? "FIRED" : "DID-NOT-FIRE",
spOk ? "balanced" : "BROKEN",
regsOk ? "intact" : "CLOBBERED",
noFault ? "" : " FAULTED (SEH caught it)");
}
// A42AB0's original instruction must have been replayed by the trampoline:
// the flag byte inside the scratch structure has to have become 1.
{
unsigned flagAfter = 0;
if (SafeReadU8((uintptr_t)scratch + kRaidInfoFlagOffset, &flagAfter))
Log("dry-run exec: trampoline replayed the original leaf "
"-> [scratch+E1E] = %u (expected 1)", flagAfter);
}
Log("dry-run exec: %d/%d v11 observers executed cleanly (detour fired, "
"stack balanced, callee-saved registers intact); %d/%d SEH prologues "
"proved that the trampoline resumes at target+patchLen and the ORIGINAL "
"push imm32 there really executes (operand matched the image)%s",
passed, tested, inPlace, inPlaceExpected,
fake ? "; field reads taken from the synthetic cursor"
: "; the two cursor-driven field reads were NOT exercised here, "
"see above");
*testedOut = tested;
return passed;
}
// Are we inside the game? Decided by CONTENT, not by the module base: if any
// plan target already holds its expected bytes then this process contains the
// client image (possibly relocated), and the live install path is the right one.
// A plain self-test host matches nothing here, which is what routes it to the
// dry-run instead of patching memory that does not belong to the game.
static bool HostLooksLikeDnf()
{
for (int i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(kPlan) / sizeof(kPlan[0])); i++) {
const Plan& p = kPlan[i];
if (SignatureMatches(Va(p.va), p.sig, p.sigLen)) return true;
}
return false;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Window-state watcher: logs the open/closed state of the three raid windows
// only when it CHANGES, so the log carries a clean open/close timeline for the
// button click without any per-frame spam.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
static DWORD WINAPI WatchThread(LPVOID)
{
int last76 = -2, last7a = -2, last298 = -2;
for (;;) {
Sleep(200);
void* root = SafeSceneRoot();
int w76 = SceneUiOwnerOpen(root, kOwnerCreateWindow);
int w7a = SceneUiOwnerOpen(root, kOwnerModeSelect);
int w298 = SceneUiOwnerOpen(root, kOwnerAnnouncement);
if (w76 != last76 || w7a != last7a || w298 != last298) {
LogWindowState("uiOwnerState CHANGE:");
last76 = w76; last7a = w7a; last298 = w298;
}
}
return 0;
}
// The install body. It used to run on a thread this module created from its own
// DllMain 1.5 s after injection; 90CN now calls it from its install worker once
// that worker's hooks are in place, so there is nothing left to wait for.
static DWORD WINAPI InstallThread(LPVOID)
{
if (!OpenLog()) return 0;
uintptr_t base = (uintptr_t)GetModuleHandleW(NULL);
g_base = base;
Log("================ RaidProbe v12 armed ================");
Log("build: merged into 90CN.dll (client-patch\\raid_probe.cpp)");
Log("main module base = %08X (expected %08X) %s",
(unsigned)base, (unsigned)kImageBase,
base == kImageBase ? "no relocation" : "RELOCATED, RVAs still valid");
{
bool ok = false;
unsigned owner = SafeReadByte(kRvaOwnerByte, &ok);
if (ok) {
Log("initial uiOwner byte [+0x13B1E0D] = 0x%02X (%s)",
owner,
owner == 0x7A ? "0x7A mode-select -> 90CN patch IS active"
: owner == 0x76 ? "0x76 create-window -> 90CN patch NOT active"
: "unexpected");
} else {
Log("initial uiOwner byte [+0x13B1E0D] unreadable in this host "
"(expected when not running inside DNF.exe)");
}
}
// Regression guard for the trampoline relocator. This is the check whose
// absence let v3 crash the live game on the first click.
Log("relocator self-test: %s (createEntry E8 rel32 must still resolve to "
"0x01CF2A70)", SelfTestRelocator() ? "PASS" : "*** FAIL ***");
Log("relocator self-test (v11 tables): %s (5- and 7-byte patches must land "
"on an instruction boundary, and the relayed prologue must copy "
"byte-for-byte)",
SelfTestRelocatorNewTargets() ? "PASS" : "*** FAIL ***");
// There is deliberately NO chained-trampoline self-test any more: the
// first design (call through and return) needed a hand-written trampoline
// whose stack discipline crashed the v6 self-test, so SceneUiOpen is now
// observed with a tail-jump that never calls the original and therefore
// has no stack contract to get wrong. Nothing left to self-test there.
// Name the mode-select strings. One of these three is 闂備礁鎼幏瀣闯閿濆鐒垫い鎺嶈兌椤ｆ煡鎳氶埡鍐ｅ亾? and the
// branch it belongs to decides whether the button opens the create window
// or silently does nothing.
if (base == kImageBase) {
Log("--- raid mode-select strings (decoded by the game's own decoder) ---");
DumpRaidStrings();
Log("--- end strings ---");
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
int total = (int)(sizeof(kPlan) / sizeof(kPlan[0]));
int installed = 0;
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Is this the game, or a self-test host?
//
// Decided by CONTENT (does any plan target already hold its expected
// bytes), never by the module base: that keeps a relocated client on the
// live path, and keeps a host that merely happens to sit at 0x400000 off
// it. In a self-test host nothing may be patched -- every signature check
// would fail closed anyway -- so the plan itself is verified there instead,
// by replaying it against the DNF.exe image on disk.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
bool insideDnf = HostLooksLikeDnf();
if (!insideDnf) {
Log("this host is not DNF.exe (no plan target holds its expected bytes): "
"live install refused, running the plan DRY-RUN instead");
}
if (insideDnf) {
for (int i = 0; i < total; i++) {
const Plan& p = kPlan[i];
uintptr_t target = base + (p.va - kImageBase);
// The bytes actually read at the target. Reproduced in every OK/SKIP
// line: a hook that installs is only as good as the bytes it was
// installed over, so they are logged rather than implied.
BYTE at[16] = { 0 };
size_t atLen = p.sigLen <= sizeof(at) ? p.sigLen : sizeof(at);
bool readable = SafeReadBytes(target, at, atLen);
char first[16 * 3 + 2] = { 0 };
if (readable) HexBytes(at, atLen, first);
// Observe-only tail-jump entries (SceneUiOpen, which 90CN.dll also
// detours) never call the original, so they need no signature match --
// only a pre-existing E9 to hand control to. Refused outright otherwise.
if (p.allowChained) {
if (InstallTailJumpHook(target, p.detour)) {
installed++;
Log("OK %-18s target=%08X first=%s observe-only tail-jump "
"-> oldDest=%08X", p.name, (unsigned)target, first,
(unsigned)(uintptr_t)g_sceneUiOldDest);
} else {
Log("SKIP %-18s target=%08X first=%s : not E9-hooked "
"(90CN's own hook installs before this one) - observe-only "
"hook needs a chain target, so it is not installed",
p.name, (unsigned)target, first);
}
continue;
}
if (!SignatureMatches(target, p.sig, p.sigLen)) {
if (readable) {
Log("SKIP %-18s target=%08X : signature mismatch (%s) "
"- not patched", p.name, (unsigned)target, first);
} else {
Log("SKIP %-18s target=%08X : unmapped in this host "
"- not patched", p.name, (unsigned)target);
}
continue;
}
if (!InstallHook(target, p.detour, p.patchLen, p.lens, p.lensCount,
p.slot)) {
Log("FAIL %-18s target=%08X : install failed (relocation or "
"VirtualProtect refused) - not patched", p.name,
(unsigned)target);
continue;
}
installed++;
Log("OK %-18s target=%08X patch=%u first=%s trampoline=%08X",
p.name, (unsigned)target, (unsigned)p.patchLen, first,
(unsigned)(uintptr_t)*p.slot);
}
Log("armed: %d/%d hooks installed.", installed, total);
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// The one byte patch that is not a hook (see "THE CLAIM PATCH" above).
//
// Same startup moment as the hooks and executed exactly once, from this
// thread. It is deliberately inside the `insideDnf` branch: in a self-test
// host the address would be this host's own memory, and the patch must
// never be applied there -- that host verifies it against the on-disk image
// instead (ClaimPatchDryRun).
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
ApplyClaimPatch();
LogWindowState("initial window state:");
} else {
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// Self-test host: dry-run the same plan against the real target bytes read
// out of DNF.exe on disk, then execute the four v11 observers once each.
// It cannot happen inside the game (HostLooksLikeDnf), so no game memory
// and no file is ever touched here.
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
installed = PlanDryRun();
Log("armed: %d/%d hooks installed.", installed, total);
Log("note: DRY-RUN -- those installs went into private copies of the real "
"target bytes in THIS process; no game memory was touched. Loaded into "
"DNF.exe the identical path patches the live client and counts the same "
"%d hooks.", total);
int tested = 0;
DryRunExecObservers(&tested);
LogWindowState("dry-run window state:");
}
Log("now click the raid button, then the two buttons in the mode window.");
HANDLE watch = CreateThread(NULL, 0, WatchThread, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (watch) CloseHandle(watch);
return 0;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// ENTRY POINT -- called by 90CN.dll, not by the loader.
//
// This was this module's DllMain while it was a DLL of its own. Merged into
// 90CN the call site is 90CN's install worker, after that worker has installed
// its own hooks: the SceneUiOpen observer chains onto 90CN's E9 there, and the
// one-shot guard below keeps a second call (a host that calls it twice) from
// installing anything twice.
//
// Written as a plain function on purpose: no CreateThread, no DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH
// state to inspect. The caller is already a worker thread.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
extern "C" void InstallRaidProbe()
{
// MUST be first: stops any later CRT misuse from fastfailing the client.
_set_invalid_parameter_handler(NoOpInvalidParameter);
_set_abort_behavior(0, _WRITE_ABORT_MSG | _CALL_REPORTFAULT);
// This module's own base, taken from an address inside it, so the dry-run
// self-test can resolve DNF.exe relative to the directory it loaded from.
HMODULE selfModule = NULL;
if (!GetModuleHandleExW(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS |
GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_UNCHANGED_REFCOUNT,
reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(&InstallRaidProbe),
&selfModule)) {
selfModule = NULL;
}
g_selfModule = selfModule;
ResolveSelfDirectory(selfModule);
if (InterlockedExchange(&g_started, 1) != 0) return;
InitializeCriticalSection(&g_logLock);
g_t0 = GetTickCount();
InstallThread(NULL); // synchronous: the caller already owns a thread
}
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